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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The Joint Effects-based Contracting Execution System (JEBCES) 
provides the general framework for an integrated composite of people, products 
and processes to deliver an acquisition capability.  Within this framework, the 
researchers proposed a Phase-based Acquisition Capability (PBAC) as an 
enabling concept.  PBAC absorbs variations in both warfighter requirements 
definitions and contingency contracting officer execution methodologies by 
standardizing the contracting methodology and a percentage of kinetic, post-
kinetic operational requirements.   
The researchers based PBAC on their experiences with the Department of 
Army’s contracting model for the Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program, the 
United States Special Operations Command’s Integrated Weapon System 
Support contract, wherein a single umbrella contract is capable of supporting 
multiple stages of an operation, as well as modifications and sustainment of the 
Special Operation Forces AC-130 and MC-130H weapon systems platforms, 
through the use of a discrete Contract Line Item Number (CLIN) structures.  In 
similar fashion, PBAC supports the CCDR’s strategic objectives through time-
definite delivery of supplies and services through out all phases of the Campaign 
Plan: Shaping, Deterring, Dominating, Stabilizing, and Enabling; phases 0-V, 
respectively.  
Through discrete-event modeling and simulation of the current 
contingency contracting process and the proposed, the researchers assessed 
cycle-time reductions the FY 07 Joint Contingency Contracting System 
requirements data and the implications these reductions have on Contingency 
Contracting Officer utilization rates.  Specific recommendations include: design a 
deployable IT solution to integrate contacting at the theater Level, conduct a 
spend analysis on contingencies, decide contracts to pre-compete based on 
spend analysis; determine utilization of contingency contracting officers relative 
to the specific contingency. 
 xxiv
 





Initial efforts to integrate and synchronize tactical joint expeditionary 
contracting support with the Campaign Plan (CP) phases for Operation Iraqi 
Freedom (OIF) were delayed by variations in contingency contracting officer 
experience, procurement methodologies, and business processes.  As a result, 
in the Stabilize Phase (Phase IV) of the CP, the Department of Defense 
established the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq (JCC-I) to integrate warfighter 
campaign plans and synchronize the contracting effort.  During Phase V, Enable 
Civil Authority DoD aligned contracting for Afghanistan under JCC-I to form the 
Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A). Under this phase JCC-
I/A implemented the use of Effects-based Contracting (EBC) as an innovative 
method to integrate contingency contracting officers (CCOs) into warfighter 
operational planning cycles to align tactical contracting efforts with the 
warfighter’s main effort (FRAGO 09-1117,2006). 
Although the EBC methodology has significant implications for improved 
joint expeditionary contracting execution, recent reports such as the Gansler 
Commission Report:  Urgent Reform Required Army Expeditionary Contracting 
underscore systemic variations in requirements definitions and service-specific 
approaches to CCO training and development,  which directly determines and 
influences execution.  Against this backdrop, the researchers introduce the 
general framework for JEBCES and propose a Phase-based Acquisition 
Capability (PBAC) as an enabling concept. Through discrete–event simulation 
and simulation, examines the extent a PBAC can reduce cumulative variations in 
warfighter requirements definitions and CCO execution methodologies, thereby  
minimizing administrative burden on CCOs and creating efficiency and uniformity 
in joint contingency contracting execution. 
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B. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH 
The objective of this research is to analyze the application of Phased-
Based Acquisition Capability (PBAC) within the EBC methodology framework. 
Through discrete event modeling and simulation, the researchers will assess the 
value of equipping the joint expeditionary contracting force with a rapidly 
deployable pre-warded PBAC. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question is:  Does transforming a baseline of 
common kinetic and post-kinetic operational requirements into a standard PBAC 
improve joint expeditionary contracting execution? 
To aid in addressing the primary research question, four secondary questions will 
also be addressed: 
1.  How can a PBAC provide for efficient use of limited contracting  
  officer resources? 
2.   What conclusions and recommendations can be drawn from 
applying systems engineering modeling to recent contingency 
contracting data under a researcher designed PBAC model? 
3.   Can a model be developed which can validate efficiencies to be 
gained by using the PBAC model developed by the researchers? 
4.  Would there be measurable benefits to be gained by introducing 
contracting into Phase 0 of the joint planning process? 
D. METHODOLOGY 
Research for this project includes a literature review of Government 
reports, joint publications, and academic research papers such as but not limited 
to previous Naval Postgraduate School Contingency Contracting theses and 
academic research papers.  Additionally, this project provides discrete-event 
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simulation modeling of both the current joint expeditionary contacting execution 
process and our proposed model for execution.  Modeling and simulation is the 
process of building a logical model and using computers to simulate and gain 
insight to the conversion of inputs to outputs; specifically, how they impact the 
model’s behavior.  Our project team used Arena 10.0 Forward Business 
Solutions by Rockwell Software, Inc.  The information used to develop models 
and FY07 requirements data were obtained from the Joint Contingency 
Contracting System.  Finally, this project incorporates input from the personal 
experiences of the authors, a Contingency Contracting Officer/Aide-de-Camp to 
the Commanding General of the Joint Contracting Command, JCC-I/A 
Commanding Generals Staff Operations Officer (J3), and Administrative 
Contracting Officers for Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. 
E. ASSUMPTIONS 
The authors assume readers will peruse this project with a fundamental 
understanding that, “the President is responsible for national security.  The 
National Security Council helps the President determine how best to employ the 
instruments of power to achieve national goals.  The National Security Council 
coordinates the efforts of all governmental agencies to execute a synchronized 
strategy that most effectively uses all the instruments.  The Department of 
Defense—under the leadership of the Secretary of Defense—Prepares the 
National Defense Strategy.  It synchronizes Defense Department support of the 
National Security Strategy.  The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the 
principle military advisor to the President, National Security Council, and 
Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff and combatant commanders.  The 
National Military Strategy contains the advice of the Chairman of the Joints 
Chiefs of Staff on the role of the Armed Forces implementing the National 
Security and National Defense Strategies.  The chairman, on behalf of the 
Secretary of Defense, directs combatant commanders (CCDRs) to develop 
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theater security cooperation plans as well as war and contingency 
plans[Campaign Plans]” (FM-1, US Army Future Force Capstone, 2005, p. 4 and 
5). 
F. DEFINITIONS AND TERMS 
The following definitions are provided to establish the joint effects-based 
contracting execution framework: 
Effects – “an effect is a physical and/or behavioral state of s systems that 
results from an action, set of actions, or another effect. A desired effect 
can also be thought of as condition that can support achieving an 
associated objective, while an undesired effect is a condition that can 
inhibit progress toward and object” (JP 5-0, 2006, p. III-12).  
Effects-Based Operations – “vital part of the new approach to warfare is 
the emerging arena of effects-based operations (EBO).  A further step 
away from annihilation or attrition warfare, EBO, explicitly and logically 
links the effects of individual tactical actions directly to desired military and 
political outcomes” (Joint Publication 5-0, 2006, p. III-28).  
Enabling Concept – “is a description of how a particular task or procedure 
is performed, within the context of a broader functional area, using a 
particular capability, such as a specific technology, training education 
program, organization, facility, etc.  An enabling concept describes the 
accomplishment of a particular task that makes possible military function 
or sub-function” (Defense Adaptive Red Team, 2002, p.10).  
Acquisition – “Definitions for Words and Terms, defines acquisition as 
acquiring by contract with appropriated funds of supplies or services 
(including construction) by and for the use of the Federal Government 
through purchase or lease, whether the supplies or serves are already in 
existence or must be created, developed, or demonstrated, and evaluated. 
Acquisition begins at the point when agency needs are established and 
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includes the description of requirements to satisfy agency needs, 
solicitation and selection of sources, award of contracts, contracting 
financing, contract performance, contract administration, and those 
technical and management functions directly related to the process of 
fulfilling agency needs by contract” (FAR 2.101). 
Contract Types – Contract types are grouped into two broad categories:  
fixed price and cost reimbursement contracts, in which the contractor has 
full responsibility for the performance costs and resulting profit (or loss), to 
cost-plus-fixed fee, in which the contractor has minimal responsibility for 
the performance cost and the negotiated fee (profit) is fixed. In between 
there are various incentive contracts in which the contractor’s 
responsibility for the performance costs and the profit or fee incentives 
offered are tailored to the uncertainties involved in contract performance 
(FAR 16.1(b)). 
Delivery Order Contracts – Contract for a supply that does not procure or 
specify a firm quantity of supplies (other that a minimum and maximum 
quantity) and that provides for issuance of orders for the delivery of 
supplies during the period of the contract. 
Task Order Contracts – Contract for services that does not procure or 
specify a firm quantity of service (other than a minimum and a maximum 
quantity) and that provides for the issuance of orders for the performance 
of tasks during the period of the contract (FAR 16.501). 
Theory of Constraints – The TOC proposes that in any multi-stage 
processing system, one stage will be slower than the others. 
The theory of constraints has 5 steps. 
1. Identify the system constraints (no improvement is possible unless 
the constraint or weakest link is found) 
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2. Decide how to exploit the system constraints (Make the constraints 
as effective as possible) 
3. Subordinate everything else to that decision (align every other part 
of the system to support the constraints even if this reduces the 
efficiency of non-constraint resources) 
4. Evaluate the system constraints (if output is still inadequate, 
acquire more of this resource so it no longer is a constraint) 
5. If in the previous steps, the constraints have been broken, go back 
to step 1, but do not let inertia become the system constraint. (After 
this constraint problem is solved, go back to the beginning and start 
over. This is a continuous process of improvement: identifying 
constraints, breaking them, and then identifying the new ones that 
result) (Apte et al., 2006, p. 103). 
Little’s Law - Little’s Law states the following fundamental relation always holds 
true among the average flow rate (throughput), R, the average cycle time, T, and 
the average inventory, I:  I = R x T (Apte et al., 2006, p. 20) 
 
G. ORGANIZATION OF RESEARCH 
The following chapters capture the initial study on a conceptual JEBCES. 
Chapter I, Introduction, introduces the research project by providing background, 
objectives of the research, research questions, methodology and assumptions; 
key definitions and terms.  Chapter II, Overview of operation Iraqi Freedom 
Campaign Plan, Lines of Operations and Effects-Based Contracting, presents the 
warfighter’s operational framework and explores the effectiveness of EBC 
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methodologies under the Enable Civil Authority Phase (phase V) of the OIF CP. 
Chapter III, Identification and Analysis of Problems, reviews the evolution of the 
joint expeditionary contracting experience in Iraq from the Deter Phase (phase I) 
through the Stabilize Phase (Phase IV) of the CP and highlights systemic 
variations in such areas as requirements definition and service-specific joint 
expeditionary contracting execution.  Chapter IV, JEBCES Systems Engineering, 
introduces the general framework for JEBCES, and presents the enabling 
concept of a Phase-based Acquisition Capability (PBAC).  Chapter V, PBAC 
Modeling and Simulation, introduces discrete-event simulation of the current joint 
expeditionary contracting execution process and our conceptual model.  Chapter 
VI, Analysis and Results, presents the simulation results, analysis, and, 
implications for future joint expeditionary contracting execution.  Chapter VII 
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II.  OVERVIEW OF OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM CAMPAIGN 
PLAN, LINES OF OPERATIONS AND EFFECTS-BASED 
CONTRACTING 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Before analyzing Effects-based Contracting (EBC) methodologies, it is 
essential to establish a basic understanding of the warfighter’s operational 
framework for OIF.  The first section of this chapter provides a general 
background on the phases of the CP and related activities under each phase.  
The second section describes the Lines of Operations (LOOs) within the CP and 
highlights the importance of their synchronization to deliver effects. The third 
section analyzes EBC methodologies during Operation Together Forward I 
(OTFI), construction of the Rusafa Law and Order Facility, and Iraqi Date Palm 
Spraying Operations as these represent some of the earliest and latest examples 
of EBC execution.  As such, they illustrate the importance of synchronized, time-
definite delivery of supplies and services to support the Combatant Commander’s 
(CCDR’s) strategic objectives.  The authors thought it prudent to begin this 
discussion at the point at which joint expeditionary contract support and the 
CCDR’s strategic objectives converge, the CCDR’s campaign plan; followed by a 
discussion of the broader, national strategic framework that the CP supports.  
B.  OIF CAMPAIGN PLAN PHASES 
A campaign plan embodies the theater combatant commander’s 
strategic vision for the arrangement of operations needed to attain 
the strategic objectives assigned by a higher authority.  It achieves 
unity of effort with unified action (joint, combined, or coalition, an 
interagency); clearly defines what constitutes success; and serves 
as the basis for subordinate planning.  A campaign plan is the 
operational extension of the combatant commander’s theater 
strategy. 
(Kidder, 2004, p.1) 
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Figure 1 identifies OIF Phasing and related activities to arrange 
capabilities in time, space and purpose to accomplish strategic objectives.  
 
Figure 1.   Campaign Plan Phases and Related Activities (Johnson, 2008) 
Although the phase-specific activities of the OIF CP are classified, Joint 
Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, provides a broad overview of the intent 
of each phase and generic phase-related activities: 
1. Phase I:  Deter Phase (November 2002):  “The intent of this phase 
is to deter undesirable adversary action by demonstrating the capabilities and 
resolve of the joint force.  It differs from deterrence that occurs in the shape 
phase [Phase 0] in that it is largely characterized by preparatory actions that 
specifically support or facilitate the execution of subsequent phases of the 
operation/campaign.  Once the crisis is defined, these actions include 
mobilization, tailoring of forces and other pre-deployment activities; initial 
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deployments into a theater; employment of ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance] assets to provide real-time and near real-time situational 
awareness; setting up of transfer operations at enroute locations to support aerial 
ports of debarkation in post-chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-
yield explosive attack configurations; and development of mission-tailored C2 
[command and control], intelligence, force protection, transportation, and logistic 
requirements to support the JFC’s [Joint Force Commander’s] concepts of 
operations.  CCDRs continue to engage multinational partners, thereby providing 
a basis further crisis response.  Liaison teams and coordination with other 
agencies assist in setting the conditions for execution of subsequent phases of 
the campaign or operation.  Many actions under the deter phase build on security 
cooperation activities from the previous phase [Phase 0—shaping] and are 
conducted as part of security cooperation plans and activities.  They can also be 
a part of stand-alone operations” (JP 5-0, 2006 p. IV-36). 
 
2. Phase II:  Seize the Initiative Phase (January 2003):  “JFCs seek 
to seize the initiative in combat and noncombat situations through the application 
of appropriate joint force capabilities.  In combat operations this involves 
executing offensive operations at the earliest possible time, forcing the adversary 
to offensive culmination and setting the conditions for decisive operations.  Rapid 
application of joint combat power may be required to delay, impede, or halt the 
adversary's initial aggression to deny the initial objectives.  If an adversary has 
achieved its initial objectives, the early and rapid application of offensive combat 
power cans dislodge adversary forces from their positions, creating conditions for 
exploitation, pursuit, and ultimate destruction of both those forces and their will to 
fight during the dominate phase.  During this phase, operations to gain access to 
the infrastructure and to expand friendly freedom of action continue while the 
JFC seeks to degrade adversary capabilities with the intent of resolving the crisis 
at the earliest opportunity.  In all operations, the JFC establishes conditions for 
stability by providing immediate assistance to relieve conditions that precipitated 
the crisis” (JP 5-0, 2006 p. IV-36). 
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3. Phase III:  Dominate Phase (April 2003):  “The dominate phase 
focuses on breaking the enemy’s will for organized resistance or, in noncombat 
situations, control of the operational environment.  Success in this phase 
depends upon overmatching joint force capability at the critical time and place.  
This phase includes full employment joint force capabilities and continues the 
appropriate sequencing of forces into the OA [operational area] as quickly as 
possible.  When a campaign or operation is focused on conventional enemy 
forces, and the dominate phase normally concludes with decisive operations that 
drive and adversary to culmination and achieve the JFC’s operational objectives.  
Against unconventional adversaries, decisive operations are characterized by 
dominating and controlling the operational environment through a combination of 
conventional, unconventional, information and stability operations.  Stability 
operations are conducted as needed to ensure a smooth transition to the next 
phase and relieve suffering.  In noncombat situations, the joint force’s activities 
seek to control the situation or operational environment.  Dominate phase 
activities may establish the conditions for an early favorable conclusion or 
operations or set the conditions for transition to the next phase” (JP 5-0, 2006 p. 
IV-37). 
4. Phase IV:  Stabilize Phase (Jan 2004 – December 2005):  “The 
stabilize phase is required when there is no fully functional, legitimate civil 
governing authority present.  The joint force may be required to perform limited 
local governance, integrating the efforts of other supporting/contributing 
multinational, IGO [intergovernmental organizations], NGO [nongovernmental 
organizations], or USG [US Government] agency participants until legitimate 
local entities are functioning.  This includes providing or assisting in the provision 
of basic services to the population.  The stabilize phase is typically characterized 
by a change from sustained combat operations to stability operations. Stability 
operations are necessary to ensure that the threat (military and/or political) is 
reduced to a manageable level that can be controlled by the potential civil 
authority or, in noncombat situations, to ensure that the situation leading to the 
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original crisis does not reoccur and/or its effects are mitigated. Redeployment 
operations may begin during this phase and should be as early as possible. 
Throughout this segment, the JFC continuously assesses the impact of current 
operations on the ability to transfer overall regional authority to a legitimate civil 
entity, which marks the end of this phase” (JP 5-0, 2006 p. IV-37). 
5. Phase V:  Enable Civil Authority (Jan 2006 – Present):  “This 
phase is predominantly characterized by joint force support to legitimate civil 
governance in theater.  Depending upon the level of indigenous state capacity, 
joint force activities during phase V may be at the behest of that authority or they 
may be under its direction.  The goal for the joint forces it to enable the viability of 
the civil authority and its provision of essential services to the largest number of 
people in the region.  This includes coordination of joint force actions with 
supporting or supported multinational, agency, and other organization 
participants; establishment of MOEs [measures of effectiveness]; and influencing 
the attitude of the population favorably regarding the U.S. and local civil 
authority’s objectives.  DOD policy is to support indigenous persons or groups 
promoting freedom, rule of law, and an entrepreneurial economy and opposing 
extremism and murder of civilians.  The joint force will be in a supporting role to 
the legitimate civil authority in the region throughout the enable civil authority 
phase Redeployment operations, particularly for combat units, will often begin 
during this phase and should be identified as early as possible.  The military end 
state is achieved during this phase, signaling the end of the campaign or 
operation.  Operations are complete when redeployment is complete.  
Combatant command involvement with other nations and agencies, beyond the 
termination of joint operations, may be required to achieve the national strategic 
end state” (JP 5-0, 2006 p. IV-37). 
C. LINES OF OPERATION 
As JFCs visualize the design of the operation, they may use 
several LOO [Lines of Operations].to help visualize the intended 
progress of the joint force toward achieving operational and 
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strategic objectives.  LOOs define the orientation of the force in 
time, space and purpose in relation to and adversary or objective. 
Normally, joint operations require commanders to synchronize 
activities along multiple and complementary LOOs working through 
a series of strategic and operational objectives to attain the military 
end state.  Figure 2. presents four notional logical LOOs from the 
CCDRs perspective based on an arrangement of tasks necessary 
to accomplish objectives (JP 5-0, 2006 p.IV-19).  
 
Figure 2.   Sample Logical Lines of Operations  (From:  JP 5-0, Joint Operation 
Planning, 2006) 
Of particular note in Figure 2 is that the United States Instruments of 
power: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic must be synchronized 
through out the CP to achieve National Strategic Objectives.  According to former 
commanding general of the Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), Major General 
Peter W. Chiarelli,  
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operations maintained orientation on a well-founded campaign plan 
balanced along five integrated conceptual LOOs.  Each LOO was 
tied to a robust Information Operations capability (a sixth LOO), 
moving incrementally and cumulatively toward decisively 
accomplishing the goal of shifting Baghdad away from instability 
and a recruiting ground for insurgents, to a thriving modern city 
encompassing one-third of Iraq’s population (Chiarelli and 
Michaelis, 2005, p. 1). 
The first LOO is the Military Line of Operation (MLO), where the MNC-I 
provides command and control of operations throughout Iraq (MNC-I Mission 
Statement, 2006).  The second LOO is the Transitional Line of Operation (TLO). 
Along this LOO, the Multinational Security Transition Corps-Iraq (MNSTC-I 
commonly called "min-sticky"), is responsible for organizing, training, equipping 
and mentoring Iraqi Security Forces throughout the country of  Iraq (MNSTC-I 
Mission Statement, 2006).  The third LOO is the Reconstruction Line of 
Operation (RLO), where the United States Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region 
Division (GRD) provides quality and sustainable, responsive, full spectrum 
engineering services to support civil and military construction in Iraq (GRD 
Mission Statement, 2006).  The fourth LOO is the Economic Line of Operation 
(ELO), wherein the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A) is 
charged with providing contract support warfighter as well as stimulating the Iraqi 
economy.  The fifth is the Governance Line of Operation (GLO), where in the rest 
of the US interagency community such as the Department of Justice and 
Department of State shares the responsibility to assist in local and national 
governance.  
The LOOs are linked into the three integrated strategic tracks of the 2005 
National Security Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSSVI)—political, security, and 
economic.  According to the NSSVI,  
the objective of the Political Track is to help the Iraqi people to 
forge a broadly supported national compact democratic 
government, thereby isolating enemy elements from the broader 
public.  To achieve this objective the methodology is to:  Isolate 
hardened enemy elements from those who can be one over to a 
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peaceful political process by countering false propaganda and 
demonstrating to the Iraqi people that they have a steak in a viable, 
democratic Iraq.  Engage those outside the political process and 
invite in those willing to turn away from violence through ever-
expanding avenues of peaceful participation.  Build stable, 
pluralistic, and effective national institutions that can protect the 
interests of all Iraq’s, and facilitate Iraq’s full integration into the 
international community (National Security Strategy for Victory Iraq, 
2005, p. 8). 
The objective of the Security Track is to secure their country while 
carrying out a campaign to defeat the terrorists and neutralize the 
insurgency. The methodology is to: Clear areas of enemy control by 
remaining on the offensive, killing and capturing enemy fighters and 
denying them safe-haven. Hold areas freed from enemy control by 
ensuring that the enemy remain under the control of a peaceful 
Iraqi Government with adequate Iraqi security force presence. Build 
Iraqi Security Forces and capacity of local institutions to deliver 
services, advance the rule of law, and nurture civil society (NSSVI, 
2005, p. 8). 
The objective of the Economic Track is to assist the Iraq 
government in establishing the foundations for a sound economy 
with the capacity to deliver essential services.  The methodology for 
this objective is to Restore Iraq’s neglected infrastructure so it can 
meet the increasing demands of a growing economy.  Reform 
Iraq’s economy, which was shaped by war, dictatorship, and 
sanctions, so that it can be self-sustaining in the future.  Build the 
capacity of Iraq’s institutions to maintain infrastructure, rejoin the 
international economic community, and improve the well fare of all 
(NSSVI, 2005, p. 9).  
D. JOINT CONTRACTING COMMAND IRAQ/AFGHANISTAN  
In order to better support the national strategic objectives of the NSSVI 
and the ELO of the OIF CP, USCENTCOM issued FRAGO 09-1117 in November 
2005. The FRAGO established JCC-I/A and the following three objectives:  “1) 
Integrate warfighter campaign plans and strategy and achieve effects through 
contracting that further support the warfighters’ objectives, 2) Achieve unity of 
effort and economies of scale that exemplify best business practices and serve 
as a model for commerce in Iraq and Afghanistan, and 3) Create synergy with 
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economic activities in local private and public sectors, serving as a catalyst for 














Figure 3.   JCC-I/A Theater Contracting Support Structure (From: JCC-I/A, 2006) 
1. Organizational Structure  
Figure 3 presents the organizational relationships and highlights the dual 
mission of the JCC-I/A. JCC-I/A is a Major Subordinate Command (MSC) under 
the Multinational Force Iraq (MNF-I) and provides responsive operational 
contracting support to the Chiefs of Mission, MNF-I and Combined Forces 
Command – Afghanistan. Additionally, JCC-I/A provides capacity building to 
establish effective contracting and procurement processes within the Iraqi and 
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reconstruction contract support through Reconstruction Offices and provided 
operational contract support through Regional Contracting Centers (RCCs).  
2. Contingency Contracting Officer Resources  
During this period, JCC-I/A had 165 Contingency Contracting Officers 
(CCOs) with varying degrees of experience and execution methodologies from 
the US Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines.  The experience levels ranged from 
Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) Acquisition 
Professional Development Program (APDP) Level I contracting officers to APDP 
Level III. Experience levels directly influenced contracting methodologies  
E. EFFECTS-BASED CONTRACTING (EBC) 
In order to align tactical contracting efforts of the ELO and RLO to support 
the enable civil authority phase, the commander of the Joint Contracting 
Command pioneered Effects-based Contracting (EBC).  “EBC is getting 
synergistic effects through the coordination of contracting resources and 
capabilities in time, space and purpose, in order to support the warfighter” 
(Delong and Gilbeau, 2007, p. 61).  The key tenant of EBC is to insert the 
contracting officer early in the planning process, at appropriate locations within 
the unit’s battle rhythm, from the corps to the battalion level (Delong and Gilbeau, 
2007).  JCC-I/A established five key components of the EBC methodology: 
 
1.  Developing a concept of support 
2.  Identifying key players 
3. Knowing the war fighters’ battle rhythm 
4. Ensuring visibility, by being in the right planning evolution 
5.  Having flexibility within the enterprise (Delong, 2007) 
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Although not exhaustive, the following are examples of how JCC-I/A used 
the five components of EBC to support the CCDRs strategic objectives, which 
culminated in the summer of 2006 and spring of 2007: 
1. EBC:  Operation Together Forward 
On June 14, 2006, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki announced the launch of 
Operation Together Forward I (OTFI).  OTFI was one of the first operations in 
which Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) were in the lead and joint and coalition partners 
were in support.  The desired effect of OTF I was to provide aid to its citizens and 
to increase security throughout Baghdad. 
The first step in the EBC methodology was to develop a concept of 
support.  As plans for kinetic operations began to unfold, contracting officers 
were integrated into the operational planning cycles to get a better understanding 
of post-kinetic and reconstruction contract requirements.  With ISF clearing 
neighborhoods, mosques, and buildings along the TLO, post-kinetic 
reconstruction efforts had to be synchronized to deliver essential services to the 
residents of Baghdad.  This required contracting officers to proactively integrate 
into the warfighter’s operational planning evolutions; specifically; in sequencing 
and phasing. “Part of the art of planning is determining the sequence of activities 
that accomplish the mission most efficiently” (Army Field Manual 5-0, Army 
Planning and Order Production, 2005, p.I-16).  Figure 4 captures the progression 
of kinetic operations and categorizes them in terms of those neighborhoods that 




Figure 4.   Multi-National Force Iraq Slide Operation Together Forward (From:  
The Long War Journal, 2006) 
As a means to support the objectives of OTFI, once kinetic forces 
completed Mansour neighborhoods:  E. Mansour, Ameriyah, and Khadra 
(numbers 3, 5, and 7 in Figure 4), post-kinetic operations had to immediately 
begin.to relieve the suffering of noncombatants. From a strategic perspective, 
Figure 5 captures a Baghdad-wide project status of 994 completed projects, 532 
ongoing, and 1,549 planned.  Central to the success of the BSP was the speed 
at which post-kinetic reconstruction operations followed kinetic operations. 
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Figure 5.   Baghdad Reconstruction Projects by Status (From: The Long War 
Journal, 2006) 
As a part of alignment and synchronization of tactical contracting efforts to 
support RLO and ELO, JCC-I/A had to identify key players along their respective 
LOOs.  From the operational level, MNC-I was responsible for the MLO, MNSTC-
I was responsible for the TLO, and the United States Mission-Iraq and elements 
of the Department of Justice were responsible for the GLO.  Key tactical players 
were the ground commanders, local provincial leaders and the Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams.  Established by Secretary Rice on November 11, 2005, 
“the Iraq PRT initiative is a civilian-military interagency effort that provides the 
primary connection between U.S. and coalition partners and provincial and local 
governments in all of Iraq’s 18 provinces.  The core PRT mission is helping the 
provincial governments with:  developing a transparent and sustained capability 
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to giver, promoting increased security and rule of law, promoting political and 
economic development, and providing provincial administration as necessary to 
meet the basic needs of the population” (Department of State, Provincial 
Reconstruction Team Fact Sheet, 2008, p.1   
The third component of EBC is knowing the warfighter’s battle rhythm.  
“Joint Battle Rhythm is the timing and scheduled presentation of situation reports, 
briefings, formal collaborative sessions and other required actions during 
planning and execution” (Duffy and Bordetsky, 2004, p.1).  At the tactical and 
operational levels, CCOs from the Principle Assistant Responsible for 
Contracting-Forces (PAR-F) and other RCCs attended daily and weekly 
operational briefs in order to synchronize expeditionary contracting support with 
the warfighter’s main effort  
The fourth component of EBC is ensuring visibility by being in the right 
planning evolution.  At the strategic level, Major General Darryl Scott, the 
Commanding General of JCC-I/A attended MNF-I Commanding General’s Battle 
Update Assessment (BUA).  The BUA provided strategic situational awareness 
relative to the objectives of the CP and insight that would require JCC-I/A’s 
involvement in major operational planning evolutions.  This information was then 
shared with RCCs and PARC-F as they participated in collaborative and planning  
sessions with the warfighters Integrating expeditionary contracting at the 
strategic, operational, and tactical levels was innovative at this time in the sense 
that it put joint expeditionary contracting in a well-poised, proactive position, 
rather than a reactive one as experienced under previous CP phases.   
The fifth component of EBC is having flexibility within the enterprise. 
Existing contract vehicles throughout the JCC-I/A were critical elements in the 
time-definite delivery of essential services to the neighborhoods of Baghdad.  For 
example, after the kinetic operations to clear neighborhoods started, JCC-I/A, 
through existing theater-wide contracts, delivered essential services, water and 
electricity, one to three days after kinetic forces cleared neighborhoods.  
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2. EBC:  Construction of Rusafa Law and Order Facility 
Another example of EBC execution was the construction of the Rusafa 
Law and Order Facility.   
On February 28, General David H. Petreus, commanding general of 
MNF-I issued an order requiring the establishment of a law and 
order complex in the heart of Baghdad.  The purpose of the 
complex was to help the Government of Iraq (GOI) improve the 
judiciary in Baghdad and foster an environment of reconciliation 
throughout Iraq.  The GOI’s visible exercise of the judicial system 
would be a key instrument in gaining the trust and confidence.  As a 
condition, judges, witnesses, and other parties involved with the 
investigative hearings must be protected from anti-GOI attacks and 
threats.  The desired result was the Central Criminal Court of Iraq’s 
ability to hold public investigations and trials in a relatively safe 
environment.  Gaining the capacity to fairly prosecute and house 
criminals in a key component to the Baghdad Security Plan 
(Operation Fardh Al-Qanoon) (Delong and Gilbeau, 2007, p. 62).  
By using the five components of EBC, “the team constructed the [$22 
million dollar] facility faster [22 days] and better than the chief judge had hoped to 
imagine.  As a result, the chief judge decided this complex would not be merely a 
criminal investigative court, but instead, officially designated the facility as the 
Central Criminal Court of Iraq.  On April 7, 2007, the first arraignment took place 
as planned and a man held for torture, was remanded for trial” (Delong and 
Gilbeau, 2007, p. 63). 
3.  EBC:  Date Palm Spraying Operations 
The last example of EBC execution was pest control efforts for the Iraq’s 
commercial date palm crop.   
The date palm (Phoenix dactylifera) has provided a source of food 
and shelter throughout history and is linked culturally and spiritually 
with Iraq. Iraq dominated the world date market with 75 percent of 
the exported dates until the late 1970s.  This dominance was lost to 
other competitors as Iraq became involved in wars and trade 
embargoes were imposed.  Dates still remained the second largest 
industry in Iraq but production was threatened by a large number of 
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pests ranging from arthropods, fungi, nematodes, and 
phytoplasma.  The Dubas bug (Ommatissus lybicus) is considered 
the number one arthropod pest of date palms in Iraq.  The Iraqi 
Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) had controlled Dubas bugs through 
the aerial application of ULV pesticides prior to Operation Iraqi 
Freedom in 2003.  Due to the loss of organic agricultural aircraft 
and security issues, aerial spraying was not done in 2004 and 
2005.  Infestation levels rose causing a significant decrease in date 
production.  It was recognized that it was critical to implement 
control measures for the Dubas bug to improve the date production.  
In late 2005, the MOA in conjunction with Multi-National Forces - 
Iraq (MNF-I) began planning to conduct aerial spraying to control 
the Dubas bug in date palms in Iraq.  This agricultural project was a 
joint effort lead by the MOA that took months to plan and execute.  
The result was over 77,000 hectares of date palms were aerially 
sprayed to control Dubas bugs in Iraq (Blow, 2006). 
This was significant in the sense that it provided equal distribution of assets to 
cover all date palm crops, not just the crops of a particular group.  
F. JOINT RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS CENTER  
The Joint Reconstruction Operations Center (JROC) was the information 
hub for unclassified information sharing and provided reconstruction 
transparency for the 18 provinces within Iraq. GOI actors could highlight icons 
within their province and obtain near real-time post-kinetic project status.  JCC-
I/A achieved a common-operating-sight-picture by integrating into the JROC.  
From the strategic, operational, and tactical perspectives, senior U.S. and GOI 
actors were finally in a forum where they could share unclassified operational 
information.  Moreover, all actors had insight as to how their actions affected the 
others within the battle space, and how synchronized, individual actions helped 
to achieve the CCDR’s strategic objectives  
G.  IMPACT ON OIF STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES 
At the end of Fiscal Year 2006, JCC-I/A obligated $5.7 billion dollars 
through 26,994 contracting actions. As presented in Figure 6, of the $5.7 billion, 
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JCC-I/A infused $1.8 billion into Iraq’s economy (includes $716 million of PARC-
F and $1,168.2 million from PARC-R). 
 
Figure 6.   JCC-I/A FY06 End of Year Economic Stimulus Roll-Up (From:  JCC-
I/A, 2006) 
As of December 4 2007, and still under the enable civil authority phase of 
the CP,  447 electrical sector projects were completed with 124 on-going; 75 oil 
sector projects completed with 18 on-going; 3,204 water sector projects were 
complete with 337 on-going.  Moreover, GRD reported 1,047 village road 
projects; 437 Primary Health Care Facilities, and 282 boarder posts were 
completed during this same period.  JCC-I/A also reported a significant increase 
in the number of Host Nation prime contractors and subcontractors. JCC-I/A 
along with GRD directly supported the ELO RLO within the CCDR’s CP and the 
national strategic objectives of the NSSVI Economic Track.  
H.  SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed the warfigther’s operational framework along with 
the impact of EBC on the CCDR’s strategic objectives under the Enable Civil 
Authority Phase of the OIF.  Components of EBC execution were then analyzed 
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through OTFI, the construction of the Rusafa Law and Order Facility and Date 
Palm Spaying Operations in terms of:   
1.  Developing a concept of support 
2.  Identifying key players 
3. Knowing the war fighters’ battle rhythm 
4. Ensuring visibility, by being in the right planning evolution 
5.  Having flexibility [existing contracts] within the enterprise (Delong, 
2007) 
Finally, an FY 2006 roll-up of the contracting activity and economic 
stimulus that supported the CCDR strategic objectives.  Although CCOs with 
varying degrees of experience, using EBC methodologies under a Joint 
Contracting Command have proved successful, DoD and CCDRs alike did not 
realize these successes until almost four years after OIF CP activation in 
November 2002.  
The next chapter presents the researchers’ observations of joint 
expeditionary contracting execution under previous CP phases through a review 
of the 2006 Special Inspector General Report: Lessons Learned in Procurement 
and Contracting and the 2007 Gansler Commission Report: Urgent Reform 
Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting.  Specifically, this chapter will further 
detail the variations in service-unique approaches to CCO training and 
development as highlighted under Contracting Officer Resources of this section, 
and variations in kinetic and post-kinetic requirements definitions, which 
cumulatively provided numerous undesired effects under previous CP phases. 
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II. IDENTIFICATION AND ANALYSIS OF PROBLEMS  
A. INTRODUCTION  
The previous chapter presented the warfighter’s operational framework 
and how through innovative EBC methodologies, JCCI-A managed to 
synchronize tactical contracting efforts to support strategic objectives under the 
Enabling Civil Authority phase of OIF.  This chapter presents the researchers’ 
observations of joint expeditionary contracting execution under previous CP 
phases through a review of the 2006 Special Inspector General Report: Lessons 
Learned in Procurement and Contracting,  the 2007 Gansler Commission Report: 
Urgent Reform Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting. Additionally, the 
authors provide insight based upon personal experiences. Specifically, this 
chapter will further detail the variations in service-unique approaches to CCO 
training, development and deployment as well as variations in kinetic and post-
kinetic requirements definitions thereby exposing the fertile ground for both 
warfigher and CCO to deliver effects: time-definite contracting of supplies 
services through out all phases of future CPs. 
B. PHASE-PROCUREMENT-FUNDING TIMELINE ANALYSIS 
1. SIGIR 2006 Lessons Learned Report with Researchers’ 
Observations 
SIGIR is the successor to the Coalition Provisional Authority Office of 
Inspector General (CPA-IG).  The organization was created in October 2004 by a 
Congressional amendment to US Public Law 108-106; the amendment provided 
authority for SIGIR to continue the oversight that CPA-IG had established for Iraq 
reconstruction programs and operations.  Specifically, SIGIR is mandated with 
the oversight responsibility of the use, and potential misuse, of the Iraq Relief 
and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) and all obligations, expenditures, and revenues 
associated with reconstruction and rehabilitation activities in Iraq.  Stuart W. 
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Bowen, Jr., who served as the CPA-IG since January 20, 2004, continues as the 
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction.  SIGIR reports 
administratively to the Secretaries of State and Defense.  In addition, SIGIR 
provides quarterly and semi-annual reports directly to the U.S. Congress. (SIGIR 
Mission Statement, 2006).  
Figure, 7 CP Phasing/Major Procurement Authority/Funding Time 
Analysis, provides the evolution of the contracting experience in Iraq and 
highlights the misalignment of major procurement authorities, funding streams 
and CP phases.  For example, during the Dominate Phase of OIF, Congress 
established the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund under Public Law 108-11 to 
support the rebuilding effort.  However, the major contracting authority, the 
Organization for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) “suffered 
from a lack of qualified contracting personnel in theater as it prepared to provide 
post-war relief and reconstruction services in Iraq” (SIGIR, p. 21).  During this 
period, dominant phase-related activities were centered on gaining access to the 
infrastructure and expanding friendly freedom of action (JP 5-0, 2006).  
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Figure 7.   OIF Phasing/Procurement/Funding Timeline Alignment (After:   SIGIR 
Lessons Learned Report, 2006) 
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a. Phase I: Deter/Closed- Planning/November 2002  
Deter Phase related activities centered on requirements for “initial 
deployments into theater, force protection and logistics requirements to support 
the concept of operations” (JP 5-0, 2006, IV-37).  Unfortunately, during this same 
period, “[contracting] agencies were individually directed to initiate planning for 
relief and reconstruction activities in Iraq [and with] limited coordination of 
contracting and procurement among these organizations” (SIGIR, 2006, p. 14). 
SIGIR goes on to explain, “The lack of coordination was attributable, in part, to 
the fact that most of the activities were classified” (SIGIR, 2006, p.14). 
The authors contend that another “part” the lack of coordination is 
based upon the capabilities-based framework from which the warfighter plans 
contingency operations.  
The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) provides strategic 
guidance, including apportionment of resources (for planning 
purposes) to the [CCDR] and the Chiefs of the Services, to 
accomplish assigned strategic planning tasks, based on current 
military capabilities, for the next 18 to 24 months.  The JSCP 
provides a coherent framework for capabilities-based operations 
planning (Defense Acquisition University, 2005a).  
It is from within this framework OIF planners develop operational plans. 
For example, 1st Calvary Division, from the operational planner’s 
perspective, brings an inherent “capabilities”: tanks, aviation, infantry and the 
like, into operational planning cycles particularly as it relates to the logistics of 
phasing in the Infantry Division into the CCDR’s AOR.  Of particular note is that 
the warfighter organizes, trains, and equips around the capability, hence the 
terms “tanker,” “aviator” and “infantryman”.  Another, significant capability that 
possess this characteristic is the Fighter Wing, hence the term fighter pilot.  
Unfortunately, for contracting no such capability exists.  Much like the F-15 or 
MA1 Abrams related TTPs, the authors propose reframing and developing joint 
expeditionary contracting support into a capability that way the contracting can 
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enter as a capability in the capabilities based operational framework—JSCP. 
This would be the first opportunity for warfighters and CCOs to collectively 
delivery future effects. 
b. Phase II: Seize/Early CPA/January 2003    
During this phase, “operations to gain access to the infrastructure 
and to expand friendly freedom of action continue while the JFC seems to 
degrade adversary capabilities with the intent of resolving the crisis at the earliest 
opportunity.  Operations, the JFC establishes conditions for stability by providing 
immediate assistance to relieve conditions that precipitated the crisis” (JP 5-0, 
2006, p. IV-37).  
According to SIGIR during this period, the DoD established the 
Organization for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA).   
Between January and March 2003, the U.S. relaxed confidentiality 
restrictions on pre-war relief and reconstruction planning. More 
agencies then became more openly involved in planning for post-
war Iraq.  Financial and acquisition personnel, however, were 
largely still not included in the interagency planning process (SIGIR, 
2006, p. 19).  
Given the phase-related activities of setting the conditions to relieve 
suffering and the fact that financial and acquisition personnel were not included 
in interagency planning during this period, both warfighter and CCOs could 
benefit from well-defined requirements and standard expeditionary contract 
support execution methodologies to deliver essential services and supplies. 
c. Phase III:  Dominate/ORHA/April 2003 
This phase includes full employment joint force capabilities and 
continues the appropriate sequencing of forces into the operational 
area as quickly as possible” (JP 5-0, 2006, p.IV-36).  During this 
period, contracting efforts focused on the award and allocations of 
funds appropriated by Congress and Public Law 108-106.  This 
Law provided $18.4 billion in grants through the Iraq Relief and 
Reconstruction Fund 2 (IRRF2) (SIGIR, 2006).   
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The effort to design and implement IRRF 2 program became the 
central feature of the CPA’s contracting during this period” (SIGIR, 
2006, p. 34). 
The U.S. did not have sufficient oversight capacity in country to 
supervise such an enormous Iraqi-led program (SIGIR, 2006, p. 
38). 
There was disagreement over the decision to create a new 
organization to manage the Iraq reconstruction program (SIGIR, 2006).  United 
States Agency for International Development already managed a wide range of 
reconstruction programs in Iraq under IRRF 1 and was ready to have the lead 
under IRRF 2.  USACE was in country managing Task Forces Restore Iraqi Oil 
and Restore Iraqi Energy and could have been expanded to manage the IRRF 2 
program, but senior USACE officials did not believe they had sufficient existing 
capacity to manage the reconstruction endeavor (SIGIR, 2006).  
Significant financial and administrative burdens accompanied the 
creation of a new large construction oversight organization in post-
war Iraq.  Among other things, “the lack of early funding and 
sufficient personnel to support Project Management Office’s 
structure and operations inhibited the organization’s start-up 
(SIGIR, 2006, p. 38). 
d. Phase IV: Stabilize/Later CPA/July 2004 
The stabilize phase is required when there is no fully functional, 
legitimate civil governing authority present.  This required the joint force to 
perform limited local governments, integrating the efforts of other 
supporting/contributing multinational, intergovernmental organizations, 
nongovernmental organizations, or USG agency participants until legitimate local 
entities are functioning.  Stability operations are necessary to “ensure the threat 
(military and/or political) is reduced to a manageable level that can be controlled 
by the potential civil authority or, in non combat situations, to ensure that the 
situation leading to the original crisis does not reoccur and/or its effects are 
mitigated” (JP 5-0, 2006, p. IV-39).  During the period, there were significant 
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consternations in contracting authorities and funding steams management.  “In 
late summer of 2003, the CPA’s reconstruction contracting emphasis moved from 
humanitarian relief to the restoration of essential services, funded chiefly by IRRF 
1 and Development Funds for Iraq (DFI), to large-scale infrastructure project” 
(SIGIR, 2006 p. 34) 
2. 2007 Gansler Commission Report with Researchers’ 
Observations 
The Secretary of the Army established an independent Commission 
headed by Dr. Jacques Gansler, former Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition  
Technology & Logistics), to assess Army Acquisition and Program Management 
in Expeditionary Operations (Gansler, 2007).  The reports focused on four major 
areas affecting expeditionary contracting operations:  Education and Training, 
Tools, Policy, and Organization.  
a. Education and Training 
The Gansler Commission Report outlined several deficiencies in 
the education and training of contracting personnel.  The findings of the Ganlser 
Commission were: “the Army does not recognize importance of contracting” 
(Gansler, 2007, p. 29).  The Army segments of financial management, civilian 
and military personnel, contracting and contract management, training and 
education, and doctrine, regulations and processes have not enabled responsive 
acquisitions and sustainment for expeditionary operations.  According to the 
report, this has contributed to the fraud, waste and abuse occurring in-theater by 
Army personnel (See Figure 8). 
The Gansler commission found that the “expeditionary environment 
requires more trained and experienced military officers and non-commissioned 
officers.  Only 56 percent of the military officers and 53 percent of the civilians in 
the contracting career field are certified for current positions” (Gansler, 2007, p. 
2).  According to the 2008 RAND Report: Project Air Force, 
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Anecdotes from our interview indicate a number of factors make 
contracting challenging, including differences in the nature of CCO 
duties of a contracting officer at nondeployed locations, variation in 
the contracting environments among countries within the AOR, the 
short duration of most deployments for contracting personnel, and 
differences in contracting culture among military operating in a joint 




Figure 8.   Major Procurement Fraud (From: Gansler, 2007) 
The lack of sufficient education and training is leading to inefficient 
contracting and waste of taxpayer’s dollars in contingency environments, where 
there is no time to get every action approved before it’s awarded.  Defense 
Acquisition University (DAU) needs to focus on training the civilian and military 
acquisition, logistics and contracting workforce as needed for expeditionary 
operations (Gansler, 2007).  We should train as we fight: “JFCOM and Army 
training exercises must stress rapid acquisition, logistics, and contracting in 
expeditionary operations” (Gansler, 2007, p. 54). 
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b. Tools 
Tools and training need to be provided to overall contracting 
activities in expeditionary operations (Gansler, 2007).  The tools should be 
provided for “overall contracting activities in expeditionary operations so we do 
not repeat mistakes of Operations Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom” 
(Gansler, 2007, p. 103).  An internal, automated contract documentation system 
needs to be created (SIGIR, 2006).  Because of not having a standardized 
documentation system a series of ad-hoc systems were developed and these 
systems proved inconsistent (SIGIR, 2006).  Audits of contracts in country found 
numerous occurrences of missing contracts (SIGIR, 2006).  A deployable 
contracting and procurement system should be developed before deploying and 
should be tested to ensure it can be used effectively in contingency environments 
(SIGIR, 2006). 
The DoD needs to develop an acquisition information system that 
will enable geographic COCOMs to integrate and coordinate the 
essential acquisition information from all contracting organizations 
throughout its respective AOR.  Through the integration of this 
information within an AOR, COCOMs can conduct spend analyses 
to better understand what is actually procured in their respective 
geographical areas (D’Angleo, Houglan, & Ruckwardt, 2007, p. 89). 
There needs to be a system put in place to capture the contracting 
lessons learned from both OIF and OEF.  The Lessons learned should be 
incorporated into military leadership schools and the Center for Army Lessons 
Learned and other branch equivalents (Gansler, 2007).  In order for the military 
to learn from past mistakes they need to know what those mistakes are and use 
them in current training before they deploy to the battlefield.  By failing to capture 




A key element for future success as outlined in the Gansler 
commission report is to obtain legislative, regulatory, and policy assistance to 
enable contracting effectiveness in expeditionary operations (Gansler, 2007).  
The lack of a common policy or regulation for contingency operations presents 
many problems.  “Throughout the Iraq experience there has been debate about 
whether the FAR provides appropriate flexibilities for the fast-paced contracting 
required in conflict/post-conflict environments like Iraq” (SIGIR, 2006, p. 102).  An 
Expeditionary FAR (EFAR) is needed to define allowable expedient actions, to be 
used in training and provided to field (Gansler, 2007).  A standard policy would 
allow all agencies to execute contracting with a common rulebook.  Currently 
each agency in country is performing contracting functions in accordance with its 
own policies and individual forms and terms.  This causes confusion among 
those administering the contracts from different agencies and the contractors 
have to learn a new contracting system each time they get a contract with a 
different agency. 
“A single set of simple contracting regulations and procedures that 
provide uniform direction to all contracting personnel in contingency 
environments” needs to be established (SIGIR, 2006, p. 95).  “The contracting 
process in Iraq reconstructions suffered from the variety of regulations applied by 
diverse agencies, which caused inconsistencies and inefficiencies that inhibited 
management and oversight” (SIGIR, 2006, p. 95).  The lack of clarity among the 
U.S. Army procurement organizations as to the applicability of Defense Federal 
Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) definitization requirements for task 
order issued under IDIQ contracts diminishes visibility and cost control over 
contractor costs by the government.  The incomplete nature of the content in the 
contract clauses database does not support the Defense Federal Acquisition 
Regulations requirement for ensuring that definitization occurs in a timely manner 
and thus implementing cost controls. 
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Current contingency contracts have been incrementally funded, 
causing a greater workload and inefficient operations.  The LOGCAP contract 
had 141 incremental funding contract modifications in FY06.  “Funds metered out 
incrementally cause unnecessary and non-value-added workload to an already 
overloaded contracting workforce” (Gansler, 2007, p. 25).  If a more efficient 
funding steam were available JCC-I/A could be able to negotiate better deals on 
contracts (Gansler, 2007). 
Cost containment is essential for contract administration relating to 
funds control over the IRRF appropriation (SIGIR, 2006).  The U.S. interagency 
community and private industry did not have adequate prewar planning.  
Contracting and procurement personnel should be included in all planning stages 
for operations (SIGIR, 2006).  There were no contracting personnel involved in 
the initial stages for OIF or OEF.  
Contracting plays a central role in the execution of contingency 
operations, and thus it must be part of the pre-deployment planning 
process.  Whether for stabilization or reconstruction operations, 
contracting officials help provide an accurate picture of the 
resources necessary to carry out the mission (SIGIR, 2006, p. 98). 
d. Organization  
As outlined by the Gansler Commission, a key element to future 
success is to restructure organization and restore responsibility to facilitate 
contracting and contract management in expeditionary and Continental United 
States operations (Gansler, 2007).  The Army currently does not treat contracting 
as a core capability; it is treated as an operational and institutional side issue 
(Gansler, 2007).  “Viewing contingency contacting as a tactical function can 
inundate the battlefield with excessive contracting units” (D’Angelo et al., 2007, p. 
2).  This can lead to the inefficient use of contracting resources, supply 
disruptions, ineffective support to the strategic objectives and several policy and 
contract accountability chains (D’Angelo et al., 2007). 
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The Army needs a single Army contracting command responsible 
for making contracting an “Army, high quality, and core competence” (Gansler, 
2007, p. 101).  Currently there are multiple commands that have responsibility for 
contracting, none of which have the responsibility to synchronize contracting 
below the Army Secretariat Level (Gansler, 2007).  In the current environment, 
commanders and contractors have to deal with multiple HCA’s/PARCs on policy 
issues (Gansler, 2007).  A DoD-wide agency needs to be developed to be a 
center-of excellence for expeditionary contract management.  The agency should 
have the responsibility for all contract management for expeditionary contracting 
(Gansler, 2007). 
There needs to be a  
uniformed, rapidly-deployable expeditionary contracting force and 
standing Joint Contracting Command (Gansler, 2007, p. 105).   
Essential contracting and procurement roles and responsibilities 
need to be clearly defined and communicated to all participating agencies 
(SIGIR, 2006)  
The failure to define contracting and procurement roles and 
responsibilities at the outset of the Iraq endeavor resulted in a 
subsequently fragmented system, thus foreclosing opportunities for 
collaborations and coordination on contracting and procurement 
strategies (SIGIR, 2006, p. 94). 
C. SUMMARY 
This chapter reviewed two recent and relevant reports that traced the 
evolution of the United States Government’s contracting experience in Iraq, and 
underscored systemic variations in the joint expeditionary contracting process.  In 
summary, both the 2006 SIGIR Report and the 2007 Gansler Report provided 
major recommendations to improve joint expeditionary contacting execution are 
provided in Table 1. 
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2006 SIGIR Recommendations: 
1. Explore the creation of an enhanced Contingency FAR 
2. Pursue the institutionalization of special contracting programs 
3. Include contracting staff at all phases of planning for contingency 
operations. 
4.  Create a deployable reserve corps of contracting personnel who 
are trained to execute rapid relief and reconstruction contracting 
during contingency operations. 
5. Develop and implement information systems for managing contracting 
and procurement in contingency operations. 
6. Pre-compete and pre-qualify a diverse pool of contractors with 
specialized reconstruction areas 
2007 Gansler Commission Recommendations:  
1. Increase stature, quantity, and career development of contracting 
personnel, military and civilian (especially for expeditionary 
operations) 
2. Restructure organization and restore responsibility to facilitate 
contracting and contract management in expeditionary and 
CONUS operations. 
3. Provide training and tools for overall contracting activities in 
expeditionary contracting operations. 
4. Obtain legislative, regulatory, and policy assistance to enable 
contracting effectiveness in expeditionary operations  
Table 1.   2006 SIGIR and 2007 Gansler Report Recommendations. 
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In the next chapter the researchers will incorporate selected 
recommendations in bold (Table 1) from the 2006 SIGIR Report and the 2007 
Gansler Commission Report into an iterative, problem-solving approach called 
the , Systems Engineering Process (SEP). Through the SEP, the authors will 
establish the general framework for the Joint Effects-based Contracting 
Execution System and, within JEBCES, present a Phase-based Acquisition 




IV. JOINT EFFETS-BASED CONTRACTING EXECUTION 
SYSTEM (JEBCES) 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Chapter II highlighted the strategic significance of a Joint Contracting 
Command (JCC), using innovative EBC methodologies to support the 
warfighters’ main effort.  For example, after kinetic forces cleared entrenched 
neighborhoods in Baghdad, EBC methodologies enabled post-kinetic operations 
to follow shortly after forces cleared neighborhoods.  Conversely, Chapter III 
identified the negative impacts of caused by variations in requirements definitions 
and service-unique tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) regarding 
contingency contacting execution.  Against the backdrop of Chapters II and III, 
this chapter presents general framework for the Joint Effects-based Contracting 
Execution System, (JEBCES) and within JEBCES a specific enabling concept, 
proposed by the researchers, Phased Based Acquisition Capability (PBAC).  
Before presenting PBAC, it is essential to understand the desired effects of each 
joint expeditionary contracting execution stakeholder.  The authors used the 
Department of Defense’s Fundamentals of Systems Engineering to accomplish 
this, thereby establishing the general framework for JEBCES. 
B. OVERVIEW OF JEBCES SYSTEMS ENGINEERING   
Defense Systems Management College defines a system “as an 
integrated composite of people, products, and processes to deliver a capability to 
meet the customer’s need” and further defines, the Systems Engineering 
Process (SEP) as a comprehensive iterative and recursive problem-solving 
process, applied sequentially top-down by integrated teams.  “It transforms 
needs and requirements into a set of system products and process descriptions, 
generates information for decision makers, and provides input for the next level 
of development” (DSMC, 2001, p. 31). 
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Figure 9 presents the Systems Engineering Process. The Framework 
consists of Process inputs, Requirements Analysis, Functional Analysis, 
Synthesis, Systems Analysis and Control, and finally Process Outputs. 
 
 
Figure 9.   Systems Engineering Processes (From: Defense Systems 
Management College, 2001) 
C.  PROCESS INPUTS (JEBCES STAKEHOLDER DESIRED EFFECTS) 
Under SEP “Inputs consist primarily of customer’s needs [desired effects], 
objectives, requirements, and project constraints” (DSMC, 2001, p.31).  From 
CCO with variations in TTPs, to offices like SIGIR in chapter III, that audit 
procurement processes, there are numerous stakeholders within the joint 
expeditionary contracting environment and all have different needs.  Although not 
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exhaustive, Figure 2 presents the authors’ JEBCES stakeholder analysis and a 
list of desired effects—conditions to facilitate stakeholders’ direct support of CP 
strategic objectives.   
 
Stakeholder Desired Effects
CCDR Time-definite contracting to support strategic objectives of CP and visibility of CAF 
within CJOA
Warfighter Menu of defined requirements and SOWs during contingencies 
JCC Commander Trained and equipped joint expeditionary contracting force
Contingency Contracting Officers Standard tools, techniques and procedures
Comptrollers Effective budget execution  
Contracting Officer  Representatives Standard tools, techniques and procedures to enable responsive operational contract 
support
Contractors Assisting the Force Payment for goods and services
Host Nation Transparent and transferable procurement processes
Defense Contract Management Agency Complete contract files to conduct contract administration
Non-Governmental Organizations Coordination and synchronization of contracting activities
U.S. Interagency Community Interoperablity 
Congress Appropriations Transparency and Accountability 
 
Table 2.   JEBCES Stakeholders and Desired Effects. (Source: Poree, Curtis, Morrill 
and Sherwood) 
1. Combatant Commander  
The CCDR requires time-definite delivery of supplies and services to 
support the kinetic and post-kinetic operations.  Additionally, the CCDR needs 
visibility of CAF within the Area of Operation.  According to GAO,  
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the DoDs use of contractors to provide supplies and services to 
deployed U.S. Forces has grown significantly to the extent the force 
in Iraq is composed of approximately 143,000 military personnel 
and 149,000 contractor personnel (GAO, 2008, p.1).  
The presence of contractor personnel—hired by various 
government agencies, and business—has created significant 
challenges for the United States in overseeing contractors and 
managing the combat zone (CBO, 2008, p.15). 
2. Warfighter 
For the warfighter, the greatest need during joint expeditionary operations 
is requirements definition.  Given the high operations tempo during the dominate 
phase of the CP, and the supporting role requirements in subsequent phases, 
the last thing the warfighter needs is another process to maneuver through while 
maneuvering through the battle space.  Moreover, events such as Reliefs in 
Place and Transfers of Authority (RIP/TOA) further exacerbate the requirements 
definition process; specifically, when incoming units attempt to identify when 
service contracts expire.  RIP/TOA is the process in which one military unit 
replaces another. 
3. JCC Commander 
The JCC Commander needs a trained and equipped joint expeditionary 
contracting force to deliver efficient and effective contract support during both 
kinetic and post-kinetic operations.  Gansler highlights the fact that some joint 
CCO do not have the required training and skills when they arrive in theatre.  
This shortfall is exacerbated by the fact that members within the joint community 
tend to focus on simplified acquisitions—low dollar threshold items and minor 
construction.  These are not the types of contracts that are needed by the 
warfighter in-theater (Gansler Commission Report, 2007). 
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4. Contingency Contracting Officers 
Given the level of contracting within the CJOA, CCOs need standard tools, 
techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to absorb variations in U.S. interagency-
specific and inter-service approaches to training, contracting methodologies, and 
business processes.  
5. Comptrollers 
Comptrollers need effective budget execution as they 
manage the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution 
System (PPBES) at all levels.  They provide resource advice and 
guidance to commanders, activity chiefs, and other Army leaders.  
Comptrollers issue instructions for, develop, and prepare the 
program and budget.  They also monitor execution of the 
program/budget at all resource management echelons (Functional 
Area 45 Comptroller’s Development Guide, 2003, p.1-1). 
6. Contracting Officer Representatives 
Contracting Officer Representatives (CORs) serve as the CCO’s eyes and 
ears within the CJOA and need standard TTPs to ensure effective contracting 
oversight.  This is further highlighted under a recent  
amendment to section 2333 of Title 10 U.S.C, where in it directed 
joint policies for contingency contracting provide for training of 
military personnel outside the acquisition workforce who are 
expected to have acquisition responsibilities including contracts or 
contractors during combat operations, post-conflict operations, and 
contingency operations (GAO, 2008 p. 2). 
7. Contractors Assisting the Force 
CAF need better payment processes, mechanisms to quantify risk, and 
well-defined requirements.  According to a group of contractors interviewed by 
the Gansler Commission,  
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because of uncertainties that exist in high threat environments like 
Iraq, they are pressured to price their risk into firm-fixed price 
contracts rather than being permitted to propose under cost-
reimbursement terms and conditions that would make it easer to 
factor risk into the price. Government contracting officials who 
believer traditional practices in requirements planning, contract 
award, and contract management processes have often found, 
after it is too late to recover, that a traditional approach is ill-suited 
for the non-traditional environment (Gansler, 2007, p. 38).  
8. Host Nation 
Based on the existing model within JCC-I/A, selected CCO are embedded 
into executing GOI Ministries to coach, mentor, and teach fundamental 
procurement processes. This is particularly important under both the Stabilize 
Phase and the Enable Civil Authority Phase of future CP, when the Joint Force is 
in a supporting role to newly established democratic governments.   
9. Defense Contract Management Agency 
DCMA provides joint contingency contracting officers for administrative 
support for large dollar, complex contracts.  This includes the Air Force’s Air 
Force Civilian Augmentation Program and the Army’s LOGCAP contract, which 
provide base operations support and construction services during the initial 
phases of a deployment.  In light of the significant logistical role DCMA has in 
administering theater-wide logistical support, is imperative that they be involved 
in requirements definition and operational planning at the beginning of the 
process. 
10. Non-Governmental Organizations 
NGOs require the ability to synchronize efforts within the CJOA, while 
maintaining their independence.  However, under unique circumstances NGOs 




kinetic forces move throughout the stabilize phase and post-kinetic operations 
begin, NGOs may have to use existing transportation services to bring in 
humanitarian relief. 
11. U.S. Interagency Community/International Community  
According to SIGIR, there were over 20 agencies providing contract 
support during the initial stages of OIF.  As a result, many of those agencies 
possessed conflicting procurement methodologies.  In light of this, the USIC and 
the international community needs standard TTPs for contracting execution.  For 
example, during the 2006 International Security Assistance Force TOA in 
Afghanistan, ISAF had difficulties integrating their funding streams into existing 
systems. 
12.  Congress 
The United States Congress requires transparency and accountability of 
appropriated funds for contingency operations. For example, “when the U.S. 
Congress appropriated funds for Iraq relief and reconstruction, it also passed 
legislation to create a specialized Inspector General to provide accountability for 
the use of these funds. Public Law 108-106, the Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and 
Afghanistan, 2004, appropriated $18 billion for the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction 
Fund (IRRF). To oversee the handling and treatment of these funds by the 
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), this law also established the Inspector 
General of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA-IG) to provide for the 
independent and objective conduct and supervision of audits and investigations 
relating to the CPA's programs and operations” (SIGIR, 2006).  
D. REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS 
The first step of the SEP, as seen in Figure 9, is to analyze the process 
inputs.  “Requirements analysis is used to develop functional and performance 
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requirements; that is, customer requirements are translated into a set of 
requirements that define what the system must do and how well it must perform” 
(DSCM, 2001, p.31).  From a policy standpoint, requirements flow from “Section 
2333 of title 10 U.S. Code, where in Congress directed the Secretary of Defense 
in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop joint 
policies by April 2008 for requirements definition, contingency program 
management, and contingency contracting during combat and post-combat 
operations.  
Additionally, in January 2008, the  
National Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, amended section 
2333 to add a new subparagraph directing that these joint policies 
provide training of personnel outside of the acquisition workforce 
who are expected to have acquisition responsibilities including 
oversight of contract or contractors during combat operations and 
post-conflict operations and contingency operations (GAO, 2008, p. 
2).   
At the operational level and the tactical level, the system must address the 
JEBCES stakeholders’ desired effects identified in Table 2 and must, within 
definable parameters: 
• Standardize a percentage of kinetic post-kinetic requirements 
• Provide  the framework for  contingency program management  
• Optimize CAF’s supply chain  
• Utilize contracting resources efficiently  
• Manage contracting knowledge through out all phases of CP 
• Absorb variations requirements definitions and contracting 
methodologies. 
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E. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 
The next step in the SEP, after identifying the needs of the stakeholders, 
is to standardize kinetic and post-kinetic operational requirements; optimize the 
CAF’s supply chain, to enable efficient utilization of limited CCO resources in 
order to provide produce the desired effects for each stakeholder before, during, 
and after joint contingency operations Figure 10 presents the functional analysis 
of JEBCES.  
 
 
Figure 10.   JEBCES Functional Analysis (Source: Authors, Poree, Curtis, Morrill 
and Sherwood) 
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1. Function A:  Standardize 
Based on the requirements of both the warfighter and CCOs JEBCES 
must standardize a high percentage of both kinetic and post-kinetic 
requirements. This provides a common set of requirements through out all 
phases of future CPs.  This was highlighted in the 2006 JCC-I/A Commander’s 
Conference when a senior operational commander commented about needing 
contracting to help us Figure out requirements. 
2. Function B:  Optimize 
In order to optimize the CAF’s supply chain, JEBCES must provide CAF 
with phase-based demand data.  CAF can use this to forecast demand and 
that can provide DoD with significant savings through economies of scale. In 
their thesis D’Angelo et al., 2007, propose a strategic approach to 
contingency contracting, wherein DoD can identify strategic sourcing 
opportunities. 
3. Function C:  Utilize 
According to Yoder, the current acquisition and contracting community is 
providing the [CCDR] sub-optimized, ad-hoc contracted theater support 
(Yoder, 2005).  In Figure 11, Yoder explains his model this way:   
The Yoder three-tier calls for the cultivation and utilization of senior 
officers and civilians with sufficient education, joint qualification, 
multi-discipline DAWIA certifications and other professional 
qualifications to perform at the highest integrative-planning and 
execution levels.  At the highest level, the Integrative Planner and 
Executor (IPE) is the essential and critical lynch-pin allowing for the 
development of a comprehensive Contingency Contracting Support 
Plan that integrates contracting with the broader theater objectives 
in the Operation Plan (Yoder, 2004, p. 20). 
The Yoder three-tier model recommends employment for contingency 
contracting officers as listed in Figure 11 below. As described in the “Yoder 
three-tier model each tier performs unique functions, requires specific 
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education, developed skill sets, and unique personnel and manpower 
characteristics” (Yoder, 2004, p. 24).  This model maximizes effectiveness 
and efficiency of theater contingency contracting by assigning the appropriate 
level of training and experience to the position assigned and will be the 
catalyst for the CCO utilization rates in Chapter V.   
Model Tier Level & Model Title Functions/Education/Rank Highlights and Drawbacks 
 
Ordering Officer – Tier One 
• Basic Ordering 
• Some simplified acquisitions 
• Training: DAU CON 234 
• DAWIA Certified CON Level I 
or II 
• Junior to mid-enlisted, junior 
officers, GS-7 to GS-9 1102 
series civilians 
• Simple buys 
• Little integration 
• No operational planning 
• No broad liaison functions 
 
 
Leveraging Contracting  
Officer – Tier Two 
• Leverages to local economy 
• Reduces “pushed” material 
support 
• Training/education: DAU 
CON 234, recommended 
higher education 
• DAWIA Certified CON Level II 
or III 
• Senior enlisted, junior to mid-
grade officers, GS-11+ 1102 
series civilians 
• Better local operational 
planning 
• Some integration 
• More capability for the 
operational commander 
• No planned theater 
integration 
• No broad liaison functions 
• May perform to optimize local 
operations at the detriment to 
theater ops 
 
Integrated Planner and Executor 
(IPE) – Tier Three 
• Highest level of planning and 
integration – joint 
• Linked/integrated with J-4 
and J-5 
• Creates and executes 
OPLAN CCO strategy 
• Provides direction to tier two 
and one 
• Links operations strategically 
to Theater objectives of 
COCOM 
• Education: Master’s degree 
or higher and, JPME Phase I 
and II 
• DAWIA Certified CON Level 
III and other DAWIA 
disciplines (LOG, ACQ, FIN, 
etc) 
• Senior officers (O-6+), senior 
civilians, GS-13+ or SES 
• Performs operational and 
theater analysis, integrates 
results into OPLAN 
• Link between COCOM and 
OPLAN to all theater 
contracting operations 
• Coordinates theater 
objectives with best approach 
to contracted support 
• Can achieve broader national 
security goals through 
effective distribution of 
national assets 
• Includes planning, 
communication, coordination, 
and exercising with NGO and 
PVO in theater 
Figure 11.   Yoder Three-tier Model for Contingency Contracting Operations  
(From: Yoder, 2004)  
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4. Function D:  Rapidly Deployable 
Another function of JEBCES is to be rapidly deployable.  A major 
recommendation of the SIGIR Report is to 
develop deployable contracting and procurement systems before 
mobilizing for post-conflict efforts and test that they can effectively 
be implemented in contingency situations.  After reconstruction 
operations began in Iraq, contracting entities developed ad-hoc 
operating systems and procedures for monitoring contracts and 
maintaining contracting and procurement histories; this limited 
contracting efficiency and led to inconsistent documentation of 
contracting actions (SIGIR, 2006, p.95). 
5. Function E:  Transferable 
Under the Enable Civil Authority Phase of OIF, JCC-I/A CCOs are 
embedded with the host nation to coach, mentor, and teach procurement 
processes.  The authors contend a transferable procurement capability would be 
a viable solution to previous experiences during the 2004 transition to the Interim 
Iraq Government.  Of grave concern for CAF during this period, was the ability of 
the Interim Iraqi Government to receive and administer contracts under DoD 
procurement processes. 
6. Function F:  Knowledge Management 
Institutional knowledge of the pre, during, and post operational contracting 
environment is often lost during CCO turnovers, and is further exacerbated by 
the service unique dwell-time requirements. For example, U.S. Army CCO have 
up to a one-year dwell-time requirement, while the AF standard deployment time 
is six-months.  JEBCES must provide a common repository of corporate 
knowledge regarding market conditions and after action reports.   
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7. Function G:  Flexible 
Given the dynamic nature of the operational environment as it relates to 
kinetic and post-kinetic requirements, JEBCES must absorb variations on the 
requirements side and the execution side.  Moreover, it should expand and 
contract though out all phases of the CP. 
 F. DESIGN SYNTHESIS FOR PHASED-BASED ACQUISISTION 
CAPABILITY (PBAC)   
“Design synthesis is the process of defining the product item in terms of 
the physical and software elements, which together make up and define the item” 
(DSMC, 2001, p. 32).  For our concept, we adopted DA’s contracting 
methodology for LOGCAP and USSOCOM IWSSP wherein a single contract with 
multiple contract line items (CLINs) “types” (cost and fixed price) supports the 
warfighter through out the contingency and the weapon system for the remainder 
of its life cycle.  Instead of establishing separate contracts for each modification 
of the major weapon system, multiple CLINs with in the existing sustainment 
contract allows the business arrangement to expand and contract based on 
requirements definition and program risk.  Moreover, it provides transparency 
into funding streams.  Similarly, a PBAC with multiple CLIN types to expand and 
contract from the initial mobilization efforts during the deter phase to the 
transition of procurement processes in the enable civil authority phase—
conceptually, the life-cycle of the operation.  
1. Rapid Acquisition Capability 
As a means of standardizing the future Expeditionary Contracting Force’s 
execution methodologies,  
Section 811 of the FY 2005 National Defense Authorization Act 
grants the Secretary of Defense limited rapid acquisition authority 
to acquire goods and services during combat emergencies. Also 
Title 10, Section 2304 outlines the use of Indefinite 
Delivery/Indefinite Quantity task orders, sealed bidding, certain 
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actions, and set aside procurements under section 8(a) of the Small 
Business Act as examples of ways to expedite the delivery of 
goods and services during combat operations (Congressional 
Research Service Report, 2008, p.7). 
2. OIF FY07 Demand Data  
In order to establish a standard baseline of kinetic and post kinetic 
operational requirements for the PBAC, the researchers grouped the data from 
the current Joint Contingency Contracting System (JCCS) into 45 categories 
using the guide of the RAND Corporation report Analyzing Contingency 
Contracting Purchases for Operation Iraqi Freedom. (Table 1, Appendix 1).  This 
research was part of a broader study titled Contracting to Support Agencies:  
Lessons Learned from Recent Operations sponsored by Air Force Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for Contracting and Deputy Chiefs of Staff of Logistics, 
Installations, and Mission Support, Resource Integration (AF/A4/7P) and 
Logistics Readiness (AF/AFR).  The study is designed to “assist contracting and 
logistics policy makers in their efforts to improve future contingency contracting 
activities” (RAND, Project Air Force, 2008, p. iii). 
The data from the JCCS was categorized according to the definitions and 
breakdowns of the RAND report categories in Appendix 2.  Included in the Table 
is a sampling of the types of descriptions that were used by contracting officers in 
the description field of JCCS.  Once the JCCS data was categorized, it was then 
narrowed to four basic categories:  Major construction, minor construction, 
commodities, and services.  
3.  Bulk Funded Approach  
In an effort to align funding with the phase-related activities, the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation provides for bulk funding whereby the Contracting Officer 
(CO) receives authorization from a fiscal and accounting officer to obligate funds 
on purchase documents against a specified lump sum of funds received for a 
specified period of time rather then obligating individual authority on each 
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purchase using the same funds that are to be made during a given period.  If 
kinetic and post-kinetic requirements were baselined, the DoD could bulk fund a 
high degree of common kinetic and post-kinetic requirements. 
 
  
Figure 12.   Phased-based Acquisition Capability (Adapted from JP, 5-0, 
Operations, 2006) 
As identified in Section F, PBAC Design Synthesis, Figure 12 illustrates 
the PBAC.  Armed with the demand OIF phase-related activities demand data for 
phases I - V, CAF can optimize their supply chain to enable agile expeditionary 
contract support to the warfighter.  For example, during future deter phase-
related activities such as initial deployment into theater, CCO’s, based on 
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standard kinetic and post-kinetic operational requirement, that are optimized with 
in the CAF’s supply chain, could be bulk-funded to enable time definite delivery 
off supplies and services to the warfighter.  
G. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, our team applied the fundamentals of the SEP to develop 
the intellectual framework for JEBCES and the enabling capability, PBAC. 
Requirements analysis provided the reader insight as to how many stakeholders 
have different requirements from the same effects-based execution system.  
After the requirements analysis, functional analysis identified how JEBCES must 
function relative to the complex needs of each stakeholder, and still provide 
effects within the CJOA.  The next chapter will model and simulate PBAC under 
the conditions of phase IV Enable Civil Authority phase of the OIF CP.   
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V. PBAC MODELING AND SIMULATION   
A. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter introduced the general framework for the JEBCES 
and within the system proposed a Phased Based Acquisition Capability (PBAC).  
This chapter presents simulation and modeling of a PBAC by modeling the 
framework in which computer software replicates a real system to allow users the 
ability to analyze changes to current operations without having to make actual 
changes to the real system.  The use of simulation and modeling provides 
flexibility to the user by allowing statistical analysis of alternative scenarios in real 
time thus saving time and money.  Manufacturers successfully use simulation 
and modeling software to identify potential efficiencies hidden in undiscovered 
bottlenecks and wasteful processes (Model Performance, 2003).  In this chapter, 
we use ARENA simulation and modeling software to demonstrate how a PBAC 
improves efficiencies within the contingency contracting environment.  
The model developed for this research project illustrates how total time-in-
system and contracting officer utilization can be improved through the use of the 
PBAC framework.  At the beginning of the PBAC development phase, phase 0, 
and through future CP phases Tier III contracting officers provide strategic 
theater wide contracting support planning. As a result of early involvement in 
strategic planning by Tier III contracting officer, the PBAC framework provides 
efficiencies in purchase request processing and contracting officer utilization 
rates. 
To demonstrate the efficiencies gained through the use of the PBAC the 
authors focused on two key elements in the contingency contracting 
environment; the total time in system for a Purchase Request (PR) and utilization 
rates of Contingency Contracting Officers.  Total time is system represents the 
amount of time it takes from the time the Purchase Request enters the 
acquisition process (through the Field Ordering Officer, Finance, The Joint 
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Acquisition Review Board or Contracting Office) through the time of contract 
award.  The Utilization rates measures how efficiently different tiers of contracting 
officer’s time is spent in the procurement process. As indicated in Table 2  
B. ASSUMPTIONS 
The following assumptions were made for the PBAC model:   
• Staffing levels of all resources used in the model will remain 
constant during the period of conflict.   
•  All contracting functions will be standard IAW the JCC 
construct.   
• PR’s within a category will be uniform in processing times, be 
correct and accepted when they arrive and all actions under 
$250K will be funded. 
• High percentage of kinetic and post-kinetic requirements are 
bulk-funded   
• There is a sufficient vendor base to satisfy all the contractual 
requirements   
• Contracting officers will be proficient at the skill level assigned 
within the Yoder Three Tier Model.    
• Number of contracting officers is based current number of 
contracting officers deployed to JCC-I/A as of October 2008.  
Due to the fact that the model does not take into account a 
resource handling more than one contract at a time, the number 
of contracts one contracting officer can handle at a time 
multiplied by the number of contracting officers.  For example, 
there are 56 level 1s who can handle 15 contracts each, which 
gives us 840 level 1 contracting resources in our model. 
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C. DATA ANALYSIS 
1. Data Origin 
The data that used for generating the distribution for use in the model is 
from the Joint Contracting Center Iraq/Afghanistan contract database.  The Joint 
Contingency Contracting System (JCCS) was developed to meet the needs of 
tracking contracting action and a management tool to allocate command 
resources.  The original tool was a Microsoft access database that was 
distributed to each of the contracting centers throughout the theater.  This was 
then modified by each of the contracting centers to meet their individual needs.  
These contracting centers then sent copies of the data at the end of each month 
which was modified to a standard format from which the data was mined for 
reports as necessary.  The basic structure was used to develop an SQL 
database in conjunction the Business Transformation Agency (BTA) which used 
a standard format for all contracting centers.  The JCCS required that all data 
fields to be completed and JCC I/A set command polices requiring time frames 
for data entry. 
2. Timeframe and Data 
The JCCS was first implemented in Iraq in December 2006.  Fiscal year 
2007 contact information was taken from the JCCS.  The system that was first 
initiated was a best fit solution to meet the needs of JCC I/A at that time.  Over 
the next six months JCCS used a spiral development to better address the 
information that needed to be captured but was not initially anticipated.  There 
was a learning curve on what fields were to be required to ensure complete and 
accurate data.  The first complete fiscal year that was captured in one location for 
contingency contracting in Iraq was 2007. The data from the JCCS was 
categorized according to the definitions and breakdowns of the 2008-RAND 
Report: Analysis of Contingency Contracting for the United States Air Force 
categories in Appendix 2.  Included in the Table is a sampling of the types of 
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descriptions that were used by contracting officers in the description field of 
JCCS.  For the purpose of this research, those categories were further reduced 
to represent the standard procurement categories in DoD acquisitions.  Those 
four basic categories are: 
a. Commodities: a contract that engages a contractor whose 
primary purpose is to furnish an end item of supply. 
b. Services: “Service contract” means a contract that directly 
engages the time and effort of a contractor whose primary purpose  is to perform 
an identifiable task rather than to furnish an end item of supply 
c. Major Construction: $550,000 or greater as defined as 
construction, alteration, or repair (including dredging, excavating, and painting) of 
buildings, structures, or other real property.  For purposes of this definition, the 
terms “buildings, structures, or other real property” include, but are not limited to, 
improvements of all types, such as bridges, dams, plants, highways, parkways, 
streets, subways, tunnels, sewers, mains, power lines, cemeteries, pumping 
stations, railways, airport facilities, terminals, docks, piers, wharves, ways, 
lighthouses, buoys, jetties, breakwaters, levees, canals, and channels. 
Construction does not include the manufacture, production, furnishing, 
construction, alteration, repair, processing, or assembling of vessels, aircraft, or 
other kinds of personal property 
d. Minor Construction:  Construction as defined in major 
construction except less then $550,000. 
3. Format of Data 
There was no essential change to the format of the data.  JCCS offers a 
download of the SQL database into excel for a given time period.  The database 
was queried for the fiscal year 2007 and this data was used to generate the 
distribution used in the model.  The data was placed into a pivot table that 
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allowed the information to be used.  The date was used to combine purchase 
requests (PRs) for each category for the fiscal year.  The distribution was 
computed using the information distribution of the quantity.  
D. CURRENT PROCUREMENT MODEL 
Purchase Requests (PR’s) are submitted by units to the contracting office 
for the purpose of acquiring construction, commodities and/or serviced.  Each PR 
that is submitted goes through a series of reviews.  The first step is to determine 
the dollar value of the PR.  PR’s with a dollar value less than $2500 are ordered 
by the unit using a Field Ordering Officer (FOO).  PR’s with a dollar value from 
$2500 to $200K are routed for funding and then proceed to the contracting office 
to be put on contract.  PR’s exceeding $200K go through a validation process for 
approval and funding.  Those that are approved are forwarded to the contracting 
office to be put on contract.  Depending on contract type the contract may go 
through administration or is directly delivered to the unit.  The Current Process is 
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Figure 13.   Current Operational Customer Requirements Flow (From:  Camp 
Victory RCC New Comers Brief JCC-I/A, 2006) 
E. PROPOSED PBAC MODEL UNDER JEBCES 
Each PR that is submitted goes through a series of reviews.  For 
requirements over $2500 the first step is to determine if the item requested is on 
the proposed standardized menu contract.  If the requirement is ordered from the 
menu using a Level one contracting officer and the items are delivered to the 
unit. Requirements not on the menu follow the existing process and are handled 
by contracting officers according to their dollar value.  The Model is shown in 
Exhibit 1.  Processing time distribution for Field Ordering Officers, Purchase 
Request and &Commitment , Joint Acquisition Review Board , administration and 
menu contracting were based on the authors experience in contingency 
environments as no data is currently collected in theater for these processes. 
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Processing time distribution for the contracting office is based on FY2007 data 
collected by the Joint Contracting Command Iraq/Afghanistan.   
Processes:  The time for each process is based on the entity type. 
• PR’s under $2500 are ordered by a unit Field Ordering Officer 
(FOO). The ordering time is dependent on the purchase 
category; construction, commodities or service. Processing time 
distribution for PR’s under this category were based on the 
author’s contingency experience. 
• A purchase request that is on the menu is ordered by a Level I 
CO. The ordering time is dependent on the purchase category; 
construction, commodities or service. 
• A Finance Officer through the PR&C process funds orders over 
$2500 but less than $200k.  
• PR’s requiring Joint Acquisition Review Board (JARB) approval 
and funding go through an application process that requires unit 
request and leadership approval.  This process requires a board 
of officers that approves or disapproves requirements. 
• Funded PR’s are given to the contracting office for award.  The 
PR’s are assigned to an appropriate Contracting officer 
depending on dollar amount for award. 
• PR’s requiring administration are assigned to the appropriate 
Contracting Officer for administration. 
The Proposed models were run under different experiments.  A separate 
simulation was run to test the resource utilization and cycle times with a different 
percentage of contracts being handled through a menu contract. 
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F.  TOOLS FOR ANALYSIS 
Analysis of system performance was done using the Theory of Constraints 
(TOC) and Little’s Law, described in Chapter I.  The TOC proposes that in any 
multi-stage processing system, one stage will be slower than the others 
(McMullen, 1998).   
TOC capitalizes on the concept of the critical chain of a processing 
system.  A critical chain spotlights the importance of timely delivery, 
as opposed to the achievement of individual tasks or milestones 
within a processing system (New, Davenport, Smith, p. 13). 
Applying the five steps of TOC can reduce the effects of a 
constraint by guiding the manager to continually evaluate the 
system to determine bottlenecks and to synchronize the system to 
that constraint (New et al., 2007, p.14). 
Our model will focus on decreasing the overall time it takes to get a PR 
through the entire process by utilizing Little’s Law.  By decreasing the overall 
system time the more PR’s can be processed.  
Cycle time is the time it takes a unit to go through the system.  Throughput 
is the average number of jobs that pass through the system per unit of time.  
Inventory is the number of jobs within the system boundaries at a particular point 
in time (Apte et al., 2006).  
Little’s Law generally is best understood when it is used to reduce 
cycle-times (flow-times), while TOC leads quickly to being able to 
identify and elevate a physical constraint (bottleneck) to increase 
throughput (flow rates) (Brandy, 2005, p 37). 
Through the use of Little’s Law and the TOC, we can satisfy the customer 
in terms of cost, quality, timeliness of the delivered product or service and 
minimize the administrative operating costs. 
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G. SUMMARY 
The Simulation Model was created using Arena 10.0 software.  Two 
models were created.  One included the new menu contract and one that 
modeled the current contracting process.  For the purpose of analysis, the 
current contracting process will serve as the base model for all comparison.  The 
next chapter will discuss and analyze the results from the different experiments 




















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 67
VI. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The PBAC model outlined in Chapter V allowed for comparative analysis 
between the proposed and existing contracting processes.  The results were then 
compared and analyzed with an emphasis towards meeting the intent outlined in 
FAR Part 1.102-2 (a) Satisfy the customer in terms of cost, quality, and 
timeliness of the delivered product or service, and (b) Minimize administrative 
operating costs.  To improve the four measurements of cost, quality, timeliness 
and minimizing administrative operating costs we used a combination of Little’s 
law and the Theory of constraints in the model.  The measurements are defined 
for use herein as: 
Cost:  Cost for customer satisfaction will be comparable to market 
conditions comparable to the quantities ordered. 
Quality:  Acceptable for use by the customer for the intended purpose. 
Timeliness:  Meets or is before the customers required delivery date.  
The comparison for timeliness to be gauged by the model is a delivery 
time less than actually measured delivery time. 
Minimizing Administrative Operating Cost: Provide uniformity to 
contribute to efficiency that ensures fairness and predictability in the 
procurement system.   
The purpose of our proposed model is to demonstrate that the PBAC can 
satisfy the customer in terms of cost, quality and timeliness and minimize 
administrative cost, and burden on personnel by creating efficiency and 
uniformity in the contingency contracting process. 
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The data presented in this chapter shows, through the implementation of 
the PBAC framework, significant savings in the time it takes to process PR’s.  
This results in quicker delivery of good and services to meet the warfighters 
operational requirements.  The data also shows an increase in the utilization of 
tier 1 contracting officers, which in turn lowers the utilization of tier II and III 
contracting officer.  This results in more experienced contracting officers focusing 
on theater-wide strategic planning for kinetic and post-kinetic operations. 
B. RESULTS 
The Base Model represents the current contracting process utilized in a 
contingency environment.  The four experiments were run changing the 
percentage of contracts going through the phased based procurement capability 
system (PBAC) (Phase 0, pre-awarded contract).  The percent of utilization of 
PBAC for each experiment were incrementally changed to 10%, 25%, 50% and 
75% respectively.  The data was then analyzed to determine total time in system 
for each entity and utilization rates for each of the CCO types described in 
Yoder’s Three-Tier Model pictured in Chapter III. 
C. TOTAL TIME IN SYSTEM 
The total time-in-system was expressed in days.  Each experiment is 
compared to the base model.  The model gives a total time in system for each 
type of entity.  When standardizing requirements and utilizing the PBAC, average 
total time in system decreases for each entity type. For example, standardizing 
10% of the Commodity PR’s into the PBAC the total time in system decreased by 
12.2%.  At the 75% level total time in system decreased by an average of 76% 
across all categories with the highest decrease realized in commodities at 84%. 
The complete results for total time in system are depicted in Table 1 below.  The 
steady reduction in the total time in system directly represents the efficiencies of 
the PBAC structure and is largely explained by the increased use of the PBAC 
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model.  One of the keys to this research was to illustrate how the PBAC model 
can improve efficiency in the contingency contracting process and in-turn reduce 
cost, administrative burden, and increase support to the war fighter. 
Total time in system for commodities is shown in column one by each 
simulation run.  The total time in system of commodities for the base model is 
44.5 days.  With 10% of PR’s going to the PBAC the total time in system 
decreases to 39.07 showing an decrease in total time in system of commodities 
of 12% (column 2).  This format is the same for the total time in system for Major 
Construction in column 3 and 4, for the total time in system for Minor 
Construction in column 5 and 6, and for the total time in system for Services in 
column 7 and 8.  Major Construction’s total time in system was decreased by 
21%, minor construction’s total time in system was decreased by 9% and 
services total time in system was decreased by 11% with the same change of 
10% of PRs going to the PBAC. 
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Base 44.50   136.40  35.20  48.80  
10% on 
PBAC 39.07 0.12 107.90 0.21 32.10 0.09 43.30 0.11 
25% on 
PBAC 31.60 0.29 81.60 0.40 27.50 0.22 36.10 0.26 
50% on 
PBAC 18.24 0.59 49.50 0.64 18.60 0.47 23.01 0.53 
75% on 
PBAC 6.90 0.84 33.30 0.76 10.90 0.69 11.80 0.76 
 
(Source: Arena Model Data developed by Poree, Curtis, Morrill and Sherwood) 
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D. CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING OFFICER UTILIZATION RATES 
Utilization rates represent the percentage of time a contracting officer is 
busy processing and awarding PRs. The base model is restrained by the number 
of CCO available for the dollar amount of the contracts.  Under the base model 
structure tier 2 and 3 CCOs carry the highest burden for awarding and managing 
PR’s regardless of dollar value or complexity.  Under the PBAC structure lower 
dollar value and less complex requirement are standardized which allows greater 
utilization of Tier 1 CCOs.  As the data shows, when greater percentages of 
standardized requirements flow through the PBAC the greater the utilization of 
Tier 1 CCOs which decreases utilization of tier 2 and 3 CCOs.  The complete 
results for utilization rates for tier 1, 2 and 3 CCOs are depicted in Table 2 below. 
Utilization rates for tier 1 CCOs are shown in column one by each 
simulation run.  The utilization of tier 1 CCOs for the base model is .8%. With 
10% of PR’s going to the PBAC the utilization rate increases to 2.9% showing an 
increase in utilization of tier 1 CCOs of 2.1% (column 2).  This format is the same 
for the utilization of tier 2 CCOs in column 3 and 4, and for the utilization of tier 3 
CCOs in column 5 and 6.  Tier 2 CCO’s utilization rate decreased by 6.7% and 
tier 3 CCO’s utilization decreased by .9% with the same change of 10% of PRs 










Table 4.   CCO Utilization Rates 
 
(Source: Arena Model Data developed by Poree, Curtis, Morrill and Sherwood) 
 
Table 2 demonstrates the effects of the PBAC model on the utilization 
rates of the most experienced CCOs.  The PBAC model is designed to shift the 
workload to the tier-1 CCOs thus freeing up Tier-2 and 3 CCOs to focus on 
strategic contracting objectives. 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter demonstrated that when utilizing the PBAC framework the 
data shows that significant efficiencies in processing time and resource utilization 
can be achieved.  With the ability to group items under more theater wide 
contracts the efficiency of the procurement system will result in lower cost and 
administrative burden while increasing support to the warfighter.  In the next 






Rates for       
YTTM Tier 1 
CCOs  
% Change 
compared to Base 
Model 
Utilization 
Rates for       






Rates for       





       
Base 0.008  0.878  0.882  
10%  on PBAC 
  0.029 0.021 0.811 -0.067 0.873 -0.009
25% on PBAC 
 0.066 0.058 0.709 -0.102 0.872 -0.001
50% on PBAC 
 0.148 0.140 0.536 -0.173 0.871 -0.001
75% on PBAC 
 0.223 0.215 0.294 -0.242 0.651 -0.220
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VII. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND AREAS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH  
This chapter provides an overview of effectiveness of EBC methodologies 
within OIF, systemic variations within the DoD joint expeditionary contracting 
execution processes, and the intellectual foundation an enabling concept for 
future joint expeditionary contracting execution —PBAC.  This chapter ends with 
areas for future study under joint expeditionary contract execution.  
A. SUMMARY 
Chapter II introduced and explored EBC methodologies in Phase V 
Enable Civil Authority of the Operation Iraq Freedom (OIF) Campaign Plan (CP).  
Within the framework of: 1. developing a concept of support, identifying key 
players, knowing the warfighter’s battle rhythm, ensuring visibility by being the 
right planning evolution, and having flexibility with the enterprise, JCC-I/A 
integrated warfighter campaigns to synchronize tactical contracting efforts to 
support the CCDR’s strategic objectives.  For example, by using EBC 
methodologies, JCC-I/A enabled time-definite delivery of essential supplies 1 to 3 
days after kinetic forces cleared the neighborhoods of Baghdad. 
Chapter III reviewed SIGIR’s 2006 account of the experience in Iraq from 
the Deter Phase (phase I) of the CP through the Stabilize Phase (Phase IV), and 
conducted a phase-funding stream-major procurement authority analysis to 
highlight undesired effects relative to phase-related activities.  For example, 
during the dominate phase, ORHA did not have the capacity to provide contract 
support.  Additionally, the authors reviewed 2007 Gansler Commission Report 
and highlighted systemic variations such as each services’ CCO training and 
development.  The authors then capture selected recommendations as inputs 
into an iterative, problem-solving process, Systems Engineering Process (SEP), 
in Chapter IV.  
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Chapter IV introduced SEP fundamentals such process inputs, 
stakeholder analysis, functional analysis, and design synthesis, and with them, 
proposed the general framework for JEBCES and a PBAC enabling concept for 
future joint expeditionary contracting. Given that stakeholders from warfighters to 
Congress have different needs from JEBCES, the researchers proposed 
transforming a baseline of kinetic and post-kinetic operational requirements into a 
PBAC, thereby, providing defined requirements in the battle space, and 
appropriations transparency through bulk-funding, to Congress.  
Chapter V simulated the cycle time of processing FY 07 JCC-I/A 
contracting requirements data through the current process to establish a 
baseline, and then through the proposed PBAC, to identify efficiencies.  We 
conducted four experiments based on to the extent to which requirements were 
standardized.  For example, if 25 percent of kinetic and post-kinetic requirements 
were defined, forecasted and bulk-funded, what would it mean to level I CCO 
utilization?  Could standardized requirements under PBAC decrease the level of 
contracting complexity, thereby enabling efficient utilization of limited CCO 
resources? 
Chapter VI analyzed the results of the simulation revealed to the extent 
kinetic and post-kinetic operational requirements are standardized, DoD will gain, 
greater efficiencies in utilization of limited CCO resources, satisfying the 
customer [warfighter] in terms of cost, quality, and timeliness of the delivered 
product or service, as well as minimize administrative operating costs.  
B. CONCLUSIONS 
This Master’s of Business Administration Professional Report presented a 
the general framework for JEBCES and proposed a PBAC to reduce cycle-time 
to improve efficiency and effectiveness.  Given the fact that stakeholders require 




absorb variations in both the requirements side and the execution side, and 
provides the PBAC enabling concept  to provide effects through out all phases of 
future campaign plans.  
Conclusion 1: 
Transforming a baseline of kinetic and post-kinetic requirements into 
a PBAC improves joint expeditionary execution.  Analysis of the 
process outputs in Chapter VI—revealed a significant reduction in the total 
time using (PBAC) system. Under the system, standardizing 10 percent of 
the commodity purchase requests, decreased total system time by 12.2 
percent.  Additionally, if operational customers are willing to standardize 
requirements at 75 percent level, they can realize a 76 percent reduction 
in cycle time.  
Conclusion 2: 
  JEBCES provides the framework for DoD to better align funding to 
enable responsive contract support  
In an effort to align funding with the phase-related activities, the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation provides for bulk funding, whereby the CO receives 
authorization from a fiscal and accounting officer to obligate funds on 
purchase documents against a specified lump sum of funds.  If a high 
percentage of standardized kinetic and post-kinetic requirements are 
standardized, CAF could then utilize phase-based demand data to 
effectively deliver supplies and services to the warfighter.  Funding, 
aligned with forecasted requirements, can provide for transparency and 
funds accountability.  
Conclusion 3: 
JEBCES enables efficient and effective use of limited CCO 
resources. Simulation of the current process produced a utilization rate 
of tier 1 CCOs for the base model of .8 percent.  With 10 percent of PRs 
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going to the PBAC, the utilization rate increases to 2.9 percent showing 
an increase in utilization of YTTM tier 1 CCOs of 2.1, YTTM tier 2 CCO’s 
utilization rate decreased by 6.7 percent and tier 3 CCO’s utilization 
decreased by .9 percent  with the same change of 10 percent of PRs 
going to the PBAC. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS  
Specific recommendations to implement and realize the efficiencies that 
are described will be detailed in this section are prescribed herein.  The items 
listed must all be completed to integrate a functional plan that would be initiated 
prior to a build up phase of any contingency that might arise.  Depending on the 
foreseeable nature of a particular contingency would lead to a greater detail and 
benefit from the model that was validated through this research. 
Recommendation 1: 
Design a deployable information technology (IT) solution to integrate 
contracting at the theater tier.  Along with a PBAC, the IT system would be 
used at all tiers to perform the various functions that would be required in 
a contingency arena.  It should enable central contracts to be utilized at 
the remote locations which in turn would empower the strategic tier to 
analyze and make command decisions on capabilities to make available.  
A byproduct of a centralized IT system would be to make the contracting 
activities more transparent and accountable.  This can be conducted 
concurrently with a spend analysis (recommendation 2). 
Recommendation 2: 
Conduct a spend analysis on past contingencies that are appropriate for 
the area, size, and type of contingency that planning is being conducted 
for.  The area should be delegated and defined by the appropriate CCDR.  
The CCDR would be responsible for determining what would be available 
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in theater and what reach back capabilities would be needed appropriate 
to the phase.  The size of the contingency should be compared to past 
events that are similar in size and type as appropriate. 
Recommendation 3:  
Develop a pre-awarded rapid acquisition capability such as a Multiple 
Award Indefinite Delivery based on the CP spend analysis thereby 
providing future CCOs the means to enter into Phase 0 Shaping, with 
rapidly executable capability.  Additionally, at the operational level, further 
improve EBC methodologies. 
Recommendation 4: 
Once a spend analysis and a concept of operations are developed a 
strategic contracting plan would need to be drawn up.  This would be the 
time when theater wide contracts could be competed.  Per the CCDR’s 
analysis the needed reach back contracting could be put into place to 
have the appropriate resources available when needed.  Tier III 
Contracting Officers are appropriate for this tier of contracting and these 
contracts would be placed into the deployable IT solution for use in a 
contingency environment. 
When a contingency does occur based upon the magnitude, an 
appropriate manning plan would be developed based upon the existing 
available theater contracts.  This is when the true benefit of the PBAC 
would be realized. Currently there is a low utilization of lower tier 
contracting officers and an over use of higher tier contracting officers.  The 
deployment of contracting officers would be appropriate to the tier of 
contracting needs for an area instead of what is available at the time.  
More experienced contracting officers would be relieved of high volume 
routine items that are available on theater wide contracts.  This would then 
enable them to be able to meet specific complex requirements that are 
experienced once kinetic operations commence. 
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Research questions addressed: 
The primary research question is:  Does transforming a baseline of 
common kinetic and post-kinetic operational requirements into a standard PBAC 
improve joint expeditionary contracting execution?  
Transforming a baseline of common kinetic and post-kinetic 
operational requirements into a standard PBAC for joint 
expeditionary contracting execution would improve the contracting 
support of a contingency operation.  The model that was developed 
by the researchers shows conclusively that through its 
implementation, labor would reduce and response times could be 
improved.  
The secondary research questions are addressed below: 
1. How can a PBAC provide for efficient use of limited contracting  
 officer resources?  
The efficient use of limited contracting resources was modeled in 
Chapter V of this research paper and the results were analyzed in 
Chapter VI.  Chapter VI demonstrated that when utilizing the PBAC 
framework, the data shows that significant efficiencies in 
processing time and resource utilization can be achieved. With the 
ability to group items under more theater wide contracts the 
efficiency of the procurement system will result in lower cost and 
administrative burden while increasing support to the warfighter. 
2.   What conclusions and recommendations can be drawn from 
applying systems engineering modeling to recent contingency 
contracting data under a researcher designed PBAC model? 
  The conclusions and recommendations for the PBAC Model are 
addressed in the conclusion and recommendation portion of this 
Chapter. 
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3.  Can a model be developed which can validate efficiencies to be 
gained by using the PBAC model developed by the researchers?  
A model was developed that validated efficiencies to be gained by 
using the PBAC model developed by the researchers.  The 
researchers developed a model using the Arena software package.  
This model was validated by using actual process times of recorded 
transactions of JCC I/A for the fiscal year of 2007.  Once the Arena 
model was validated the PBAC model developed by the 
researchers showed significant positive improvements that would 
be gained. 
4.  Would there be measurable benefits to be gained by introducing 
contracting to Phase Zero of the joint planning process? 
There was a measurable benefit to be gained by introducing 
contracting to Phase Zero of the joint planning process.  This 
measurement was that there would be less utilization of level III 
Contracting Officers in daily operations of a contingency.  There 
would be fewer contracts and more orders on existing theater wide 
contracts placed by level I Contracting Officers that would need a 
reduced oversight at the Command level. 
D.  AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
During the course of this research and analysis, the authors identified 
areas that needed further research that were outside the scope of this project.  
The following areas are: 
1. To conduct a full spend analysis of all phases of OIF to 
establish a baseline for strategic sourcing opportunities in the 
contingency environment.  An analysis of this data will 
provide the foundation for standardizing commodities and 
services through the full spectrum of contingency phases. 
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2. Provide an analysis of the impacts of present and future 
policy and guidance on the joint contingency contracting 
process.  For example, what effects will the new Joint 
Doctrine 4-10 “Operational Contract Support” have on the 
current contingency contracting process. 
3. Evaluate the interoperability of a PBAC during disaster relief 
and humanitarian operations.  Disaster relief and 
humanitarian operations such as Hurricane Katrina provide 
significant demand data during all phases of relief 
operations.  Could PBAC enable time-definite delivery of 
supplies and services during these critical times?  
4. Evaluate CAF’s supportability of PBAC.  Can CAFs use 
phased based demand data to better forecast time definite 
delivery of supplies and services throughout all phases of the 
campaign plan. 
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1= PR’s < $2,500 
2= PR’s > $2,500 < $200K 
3= PR’s > $200K <  $750K 
4= PR’s > $750K <  $10M 
5= PR’s > $10M 
Exhibit 1 
 
  Modeling and Simulation of a Phased-based Acquisition Capability  
 
                    (Source:  Researchers:  Poree, Curtis, Morrill, and Sherwood) 
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Categories Used in our Analyses 
 
Category      Examples 
 
 
Appliances Laundry (washers and dryers) 
Kitchen (refrigerators, kitchen ranges, microwave 
ovens,    dish washers)  
Miscellaneous (water heaters, air conditioners, 
ceramic   heaters, ice machines) 
 
Billeting services Billeting (apartment rental, leasing of rooms) 
 downtown stays (hotel lodging, room bills) 
 
Buildings and shelters Residential buildings (living quarters, trailers) 
 Structures (clamshell buildings, dome structures, 
prefabricated 
 Facilities (storage buildings, shower trailers, field 
showers, 
 Water-treatment plants) 
 
Cleaning supplies Cleansers (detergents, dishwashing liquid, laundry 
soap, glass 
 Cleaner) 
 Cleaning supplies (rags, brushes, rubber gloves, 
brooms, mops) 
 
Communication equipment Local area network equipment (server, high-speed 
network 
 Equipment Ethernet catalyst switches [Ethernet 
equipment 
 Other than cards], coaxial cable, data cable, Cisco 
switches, 
 Fiber optic items, routers, Linksys boxes, X-port 
switches, 
 Secret Internet Protocol Router Network [SIPRNET] 
 Equipment) 
 Communication systems (news dishes, uninterruptible 
power 
 Supply systems, videoconference equipment) 
 Personal devices (radio equipment, handsets) 
 




Software monitors, computer speakers) 
 Computer drives (hard drives, memory sticks) 
 Computer accessories (personal digital assistants, 
scanners, CD 
 Burners, DVD burners, computer power supply) 
 Server connections 9USB hubs and cables, Ethernet 
cards, 
 Modems) 
 Software (Adobe Acrobat, Microsoft Windows 
licenses) 
 
Construction, heavy Backhoes, loaders, bulldozers, dump trucks, 
excavators,  






Exhibit 2 Continued 
Category    Examples  
 
 
Construction services Preparation (soil stabilization, clearing, digging, soil 
surveys) 
 Building (construction work, road construction, ramp 
construction 
 Clearing (demolition/teardown, tree removal) 
Miscellaneous (airfield marking, sandbag services, 
various renovations and upgrades, installation of 
equipment, connect/install generators) 
 
Construction supplies Hardware (nails, screws, nuts, bolts, washers) 
 Construction material (steel, concrete, cement, 
asphalt, wood, 
 Plywood, sand rock, gravel, 2x4s, planks, 
crossbeams) 
 Electrical material (circuit boards, grounding material, 
cable) 
 Plumbing material (pipe, toilets) 
 Finishing material (carpet, floor covering, tile, sealant, 
stains, 
 Paint, painting equipment, bathroom fixtures) 
 Runway construction and repair material 
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 Miscellaneous (ladders; culverts; manhole covers; 
heating,  
 Ventilation, and air conditioning) 
 
Custodial and latrine Cleaning (latrine trailers, hangars) 
Services Custodial services 
 Janitorial services 
 
Dining supplies Cooking utensils (spatulas, spaghetti tongs, can 
openers, 
 Cooking thermometers) 
 Kitchen supplies (coffee pots, mixers, canisters, pans 
 Aluminum foil, salt and pepper shakers) 
 Serving supplies (dining trays, paper products, plastic 
utensils, 
 Food containers) 
 Large equipment (pastry cases, beverage dispensers, 
salad bars) 
 Other (aprons, tablecloths) 
 
Financial Fees (account maintenance fees, transaction 
charges, currency 
 Exchange, electronic funds transfer fees) 
 Checkbooks 
 Rebates (International Merchant Purchase 
Authorization Card 






Exhibit 2– Continued 
 
Category    Examples 
 
 
Fire Protection Equipment (fire extinguishers, fire bottles, flame-
retardant hoods, 
Smoke alarms, smoke detectors, fire helmets 
firefighter equipment) 
 
Food (not catering) Food (break, cake popcorn) 
 Drinks (sports beverages) 
 Cooking ingredients (cooking oil, salt) 
 
Force Protection Barricades (concrete barriers, roadblock spikes, 
barbed wire, 
 Concertina wire, chain-link fencing, cones, sandbags) 
 Dog-related equipment (kennels, food, supplies) 
 Surveillance (motion detector, walk-through metal 
detectors, 
 Gas detectors, search pit equipment, guard towers, 
metal 
 Detectors, floodlights) 
 Miscellaneous (badge-activated locks, reflective belts 
 Reflective tape, bio detection/protection equipment) 




Fuel and fuel-related Fuels (diesel, acetylene, propane) 
Items (not jet fuel) Fuel-storage equipment (fuel tanks, fuel bladders) 
 Fuel-dispensing equipment 
 
Furniture Office (desks, chairs, couches, bookcases, filing 
cabinets, 
 Workstations) 
 Residential (beds, mattresses, dressers, footlockers) 




Generators Various power generators 
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Grounds maintenance Grounds keeping services 
Services 
 
Heavy equipment Large vehicles (refrigerated trucks, fire trucks, flatbed 
trucks, 
(not construction) sewage-removal trucks, water trucks, fuel trucks, 
freezer 
 Trucks) 




Exhibit 2 – Continued 
 
Category    Examples 
 
 
Interpreter services Interpreters, linguists, and translator services 
 
Latrine supplies Shower and bathroom supplies (soap, waterless hand 
cleanser, 
 Paper towels) 
 Chemicals for portable toilets 
 
Laundry services Laundry and dry cleaning 
 Linen exchange 
 Alterations embroidery 
 Self-serve laundry centers 
 
Medical Services Doctor, dental, optometry, and chiropractic services 
 Hospital charges 
 Magnetic resonance imaging, X-ray consultation 
 Biohazard disposal 
 
Medical Supplies  Medical supplies (bandages, thermometers, sterile 
water, 
 Medication, insulin, vaccines, syringes) 
 Medical equipment (X-ray equipment, dental 
equipment, 
 Respirators, lab equipment, monitors) 
 Medical reference books 
 Mortuary-affairs items 
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Miscellaneous commodities Items for personnel (T-shirts for various 
activities [not MWR, 
 Not mission [, backpacks, gloves, knives, towels, 
duffel bags, 
 Irons, duct tape, keys, bed linens, window treatments, 
baby 
 Wipes, sunscreen) 
 Non potable water (bulk water, dry ice) 
 Small containers (hard-sided cases) 
 Small equipment (locks, coolers/ice chests, small 
heaters, 
 Scales, batteries [not for cars], cigarette butt cans, 
cameras, 
 Video recorders, ear protectors, flashlights, irons, 
voltage 
 Converters/adapters, absorbent mats, air filters) 
 Other miscellaneous items (insect bait, week killer, 
 Mousetraps, flags, etiquette books, signs, anti fatigue 
mats, 
 Spill kits, lamps, mirrors [not specific to other 
categories], 







Category      Examples 
 
 
Miscellaneous equipment Small equipment (mortar mixer, wet and dry vacuums, 
pumps, 
 Refrigeration units, air compressors, blowers, hedge 
trimmers, 
 Coleman products, portable vacuums, fans, plasma 
monitors 
 [not TVs]) 
 Large containers (shipping containers, tanks, food 
and trash 
 Containers, steel drums, intermodal containers) 
 Food/water screening (water-detection equipment, 
salmonella 
 Screening kits) 
 Hard-to-categorize items (cash counters, bullhorns, 
 88
 Megaphones, hand-washing stations, photo lab 
accessories, 
 Turbidimeters, pallets, trolley jacks, locksmith 
equipment, 
 Adapters [not specific to other categories]) 
 
Miscellaneous services Miscellaneous (vehicle registration and licensing, 
photo 
 Developing, locksmith services, Internet services, 
picking up 
 Litter, photocopying, engraving, storage handling, 
airfield 
 Sweeping, grease removal [including cleaning grease 
traps]) 
 Professional services (consultant services) 
 
Refuse and   Refuse and garbage services  
garbage services                      Trash/waste collection and removal 
 
Repair/maintenance Service contracts 
Services   Item repair and maintenance (bicycles, vehicles, 
generators, 
    Calibration 
 
Tools    Basic tools (hammers, screwdrivers, drills, drill bits, 
clamps) 
    Other tools (multipurpose tools, pressure sprayers) 
    Welding and soldering equipment 
 
Transporting Cargo  Express mail fees and other shipping charges, delivery 
charges 
    Custom fees 
 
Transporting people  Airfare 
    Emergency leave 












Uniforms   Honor guard T-shirts, military boots, brassards 
    Insignias and patches (enlisted rank, CENTAF patches, 
desert 
    Patches) 
 
Utility services  Electricity charges 
 
Vehicle repair parts  Equipment (tow vehicle equipment, battery charges) 
    Parts (tires, radiators, starters, belts, clutches, shock 
absorbers, 
    Radiator hoses, wiper blades, oil filters, pumps, switches) 
    Fluids (transmission fluid, motor oil) 
 
Vehicles for transportation Passenger vehicles (autos, buses, sedans, light trucks,  
    Sport-utility vehicles) 
    Other small vehicles (pickup trucks, all-terrain vehicles, 
    John Deere Gator utility vehicles) 
 
Water    Potable water 
    Potable ice 
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